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I. INTRODUCTION
Drug asset civil forfeiture provides the means by which the
government can seize property which is deemed to have been
used in, or to facilitate, violations of criminal narcotics statutes.'
Three provisions of federal law frequently used by law enforce-
ment agencies to acquire such property are 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4),
(a) (6) and (a)(7).2 Section 881(a)(4) provides for the forfeiture
of "[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in paragraph (1) [or] (2)."' Section
881(a),(7) subjects to forfeiture "[a]ll real property... which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment."4
1 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2 Forfeiture in general has increased in use as a tool to fight crime. Between 1985
and 1991, the number of asset forfeitures grew at an average annual rate of 99 percent.
Receipts to the government increased from $27 million in 1985 to $643.6 million in
1991. ANN. REP. OF THE DEP'T OF JUST. ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM 15 (1991); see also
David A. Kaplan et al., Where the Innocent Lose, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 42, 42 ($2.6
billion of property has been seized by the federal government since 1985; 35,295 federal
seizures made in 1991, up 18 times in six years).
3 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). Paragraph (1) of § 881(a) speaks of "controlled
substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation
of this subchapter." Id.,§ 881(a) (1). Paragraph (2) includes "[a]il raw materials, products,
and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, com-
pounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of this subchapter." Id. § 881(a)(2).
The incorporation within § 881(a) (4) of §§ 881(a) (1), (a) (2) and therefore underly-
ing substantive criminal violation(s) becomes important later in determining whether
criminal drug law violations are in fact lesser included offenses of § 881. See infra Parts
II.B.3, III.B.2. It should be noted that § 881(a)(4) provides a defense for common carri-
ers and owners who are not culpable. Id. § 881(a)(4)(A)-(C).
4 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). As with § 881(a)(4), this section notably incorpo-
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Section 881 (a) (6) is somewhat different than the other two
provisions in that it is directed in part at disgorging the proceeds,
as opposed to the instrumentalities, of illegal drug activity. The
section allows for the forfeiture of "[a]ll moneys, negotiable in-
struments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intend-
ed to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange, and all moneys . . . used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter."5 This section is
primarily concerned with liquid assets and items of value pur-
chased with liquid assets which are acquired during illegal drug
operations.
Because section 881 forfeitures are litigated in civil proceed-
ings, the government must prove that it has probable cause to
believe that the property6 in question is subject to forfeiture.
Once this burden is met, the burden then shifts to the claimant
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
should not be subject to forfeiture.7 Civil forfeiture can be pur-
rates violations of the substantive criminal laws. Section 881(a) (7) also includes an "inno-
cent landowner" defense.
5 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). The provision can be viewed as targeting three
different types of proceeds: (1) proceeds acquired from the selling of narcotics, (2) pro-
ceeds intended to be used to buy narcotics, and (3) proceeds used or intended to be
used to facilitate drug law violations. The first type of proceeds may be referred to as ill-
gotten gains or profits of illegal drug activity. The second type of proceeds deals with
proceeds intended to be ill-gotten gains, but because the requisite offense is still incho-
ate, fail to actually .be "ill-gotten." The final type of proceeds are "facilitation" proceeds
and are involved with illegal drug activity in a manner that is similar to the property
targeted by §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). This Note will give separate treatment to each kind
of proceeds. As with the other sections, § 881 (a)(6) insulates innocent parties from for-
feiture.
6 The civil proceeding is an in rem action against the property, as opposed to
criminal proceedings (seeking conviction for drug activity), which are in personam actions
against the person. Historically, the property was considered the wrongdoer in civil forfei-
ture actions and was forfeitable because it was itself "guilty" of a crime. United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1,
14 (1827). For discussions of the historical background and development of civil forfei-
ture, see United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131-35 (1993); Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974); Anthony J. Franze,
Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of the "Innocent Owner," 70
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 369, 373-75 (1994); Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending Constitution-
al Protection to Civil Forfeitures that Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 194, 198-201 (1991).
7 Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Con-
stitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
495, 519-21 & nn.171-72 (1994); see 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (d) (1988).
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sued before, during or after criminal prosecution. The government
often initiates proceedings under section 881 after criminal convic-
tion is secured so that it can use the conviction to support a mo-
tion for summary judgment in the civil proceeding. Needless to
say, section 881 has become a very powerful tool' used by the
United States to prosecute drug law violators, a tool that some
fear may be susceptible to abuse.9
In addition to civil forfeiture, the government is authorized to seek criminal forfei-
ture via 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Unlike civil forfeiture, a prerequisite to
criminal forfeiture is that the defendant be "convicted of a violation." Id. § 853(a). Crim-
inal forfeiture is a criminal penalty imposed along with sentencing at trial. Because § 853
forfeiture is criminal, it is more difficult to obtain than § 881 forfeiture. The government
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is afforded all of the
constitutional guarantees that attach to criminal proceedings. However, because criminal
forfeiture and criminal conviction occur in the same proceeding, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not implicated as it is in the context of § 881 forfeitures. This Note is con-
cerned solely with the double jeopardy concerns underlying § 881 civil forfeitures.
8 The legislative purpose of § 881 was to provide law enforcement agencies with
powerful means of getting at drug dealers. A'he legislative history shows that Congress felt
the "illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the Federal Govern-
ment" and that the "price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive." H.R.
REP. NO. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1970), rnprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4575.
9 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the majority's "distrust of the Government's ag-
gressive use of broad civil forfeiture statutes"); United States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz,
846 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (forfeiture of automobile under § 881(a)(4)
based upon small amount of marijuana upheld); Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched
Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 911 (1991).
In James Daniel Good, for example, the United States sought forfeiture of the
defendant's Hawaiian real estate in an ex parte proceeding four years after the defendant
had been criminally sentenced for a drug offense. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
In 1988, the government's "zero tolerance" policy required officials to confiscate property
for even minor offenses. For example, in that year, the U.S. Coast Guard seized the
yacht Monkey Business (the yacht which had ferried Gary Hart and Donna Rice to the
Bahamas) after officials found one gram of marijuana on board. A few days prior to this
seizure, the Coast Guard had confiscated the $2.5 million yacht Ark Royal after finding
one-tenth of an ounce of marijuana on the boat. No one was arrested in either case. At
about the same time as these seizures, the Coast Guard seized another yacht in Florida
after their search yielded a dollar bill with traces of cocaine and a bag with marijuana
residue. Pete Yost, "Zero Tolerance" Drug Battle Called Overkill CHI. TRIB. (nat'l ed.), May
16, 1988, § 1, at 9.
For other examples of perceived abuse, including some in which innocent persons
were harshly affected by § 881, see Helen M. Kemp, Presumed Guilty: When the War on
Drugs Becomes a War on the Constitution, 14 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 273, 273-77 (1994); Henry
J. Reske, A Law Run Wild; A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 24. In fact, 80% of those whose prop-
erty is forfeited under § 881 are never charged criminally. Id.
Abuse of forfeitur6 under § 881 is not a one way street. In United States v. 167
Woodland Rd., Civ. A. No. 94-10851-RWZ, 1994 WL 707129 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 1994), a
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Perhaps in response to these concerns, the Supreme Court
has recently begun to curb the potential for abuse. In Austin v.
United States," the Court held that section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
forfeitures are "subject to the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."1 This holding necessitated
a finding by the Court that the sections constitute punishment for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 2 Although Austin is an
Eighth Amendment case, it has double jeopardy implications by
establishing that section 881, though civil punishes and therefore
may be limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. And because the
Court has held that civil penalties which amount to punishment
can violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
when imposed after a criminal penalty, 3 the holding of Austin
potentially sweeps farther than its specific wording.
In response to the ruling in Austin, the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals have been left to grapple with several issues, one of which is
whether section 881 forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
when pursued in conjunction with the defendant being tried for
the underlying drug offense which gives rise to the forfeiture ac-
tion. 4 As may be expected, the Courts of Appeals have inconsis-
tently interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause
as it applies to section 881 civil forfeiture. The purpose of this
Note is to propose a resolution to this conflict and provide a
framework to determine when parallel civil forfeiture and criminal
prosecution violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Note rejects
the per se approaches that have been advocated by the majority of
courts that have decided the issue and argues that whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause is violated depends on the particular
suspected drug trafficker proposed a judgment whereby the government would receive
everything it sought in the civil proceeding so as to trigger the protections of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause and preclude criminal proceedings. The government argued against
the judgment and for a stay, but the court ruled for the claimant on the ground that
there uas no longer a justiciable case or controversy.
10 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
11 Id. at 2812.
12 Id. ("We therefore conclude that forfeiture under [§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)] con-
stitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.'" (quoting Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989))).
13 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see infra notes 18-23 and accompa-
nying text.
14 The question is slightly more complicated. Whether or not double jeopardy is
offended as well as the remedy to correct a violation may depend on the order of the
proceedings. In particular, a criminal conviction following civil forfeiture may require a
different remedy from situations where civil forfeiture follows conviction. See infra Part V.
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circumstances of the case under consideration. Finally, this Note
addresses the issue left open in Austin: does the forfeiture of pro-
ceeds under section 881(a)(6) punish for some offense?
Part II of this Note presents the Supreme Court decisions that
have provided the foundation for challenges to section 881 on
double jeopardy grounds. In United States v. Halper" the Court
held that civil penalties imposed after criminal punishment can
indeed constitute a violation of the double jeopardy guarantee.
This decision serves as the basis upon which section 881 civil for-
feitures implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against
successive punishments. Part II provides further background by
discussing the Court's decision in Austin v. United States'6 and the
limits of the opinion. This Part also briefly introduces the double
jeopardy framework that should be and has been used by the
courts to resolve the potential double jeopardy conflict.
The various approaches of and disagreements among the
United States Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue are
presented in Part III. This Part attempts to resolve the conflicts
.and determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is indeed
violated when both civil and criminal drug sanctions are sought by
answering two questions: (1) whether civil forfeiture and criminal
conviction occur in the "same proceeding," and (2) whether sec-
tion 881 and the substantive criminal statutes are, or punish for,
the "same offense." In addition, Part IV attempts to determine
whether section 881 (a) (6) is punishment and should be treated
the same as sections '881(a) (4) and (a) (7) for double jeopardy
purposes. This Note argues that criminal and civil sanctions are
imposed in "separate proceedings" and therefore present the possi-
bility of unlawfully imposing cumulative punishments. As for the
second inquiry, Part III concludes that section 881 forfeiture and
criminal conviction sometimes punish the same offense, but not in
all cases. When the two punish different offenses, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated. Finally, Part IV argues that
forfeiture via section 881(a) (6) is punishment under Austin even
though the section covers, inter alia, illegal proceeds and even
though Austin covers only sections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) explicitly.
Next, Part V argues that in those cases where forfeiture is
indeed sought for an offense that has already been criminally pun-
15 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
16 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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ished, or vice versa, the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated, but
the remedy for such a violation should vary depending on the
order of the proceedings. If the civil action occurs after convic-
tion, then courts could perform an accounting of the
government's actual damages and reduce the amount of forfeiture
to a level that would indeed be remedial. If forfeiture occurs be-
fore criminal proceedings, then conviction would violate the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause and the proceeding must be dismissed or the
conviction vacated. Finally, Part VI concludes that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated every time the United States pur-
sues parallel civil and criminal proceedings. If the two actions can
be predicated on different criminal offenses or on the actions of
different individuals, courts should allow both penalties to be
imposed because the Double Jeopardy Clause merely forbids pun-
ishing the same individual for the same offense in separate pro-
ceedings. The most prudent course for prosecutors to take, howev-
er, is to pursue forfeiture criminally under section 853 in the
same indictment and trial as the criminal narcotics law convic-
tion. 7
17 This Note confines its analysis to parallel actions brought by the United States. If
the state seeks forfeiture and the federal government conviction, or vice versa, the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause is probably not implicated because of the doctrine of "dual sover-
eignty," which allows dual punishment of the same offense by different sovereigns. See
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
Although this Note does not directly address dual criminal and civil proceedings
both brought by the state, the analysis should be similar because of the similarities be-
tween state and federal drug legislation. As with the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the state
courts that have considered the issue have arrived at different conclusions. Compare State
v. Johnson, 632 So. 2d 817 (La. CL App. 1994) (Austin limited to Eighth Amendment)
and State v. 1984 Ford F-150 Pickup, No. 82,356, 1995 WL 27668 (Okla. Ct. App. Nov.
22, 1994) (forfeiture primarily remedial) and Ex parte Camara, Nos. 13-94-048-CR, 13-94-
050-CR, 1994 WL 669807 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1994) (Austin inapplicable to Double
Jeopardy Clause) and Romero v. State, No. 06-94-00002-CV, 1994 WL 601390 (Tex. Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 1994) (same) and Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. CL App. 1994)
(forfeiture remedial if not disproportionate to damages caused) and State v. Clark, 875
P.2d 613 (Wash. 1994) (forfeiture and criminal actions may not punish for the same
offense) with State v. 1979 Cadillac Deville, 632 So. 2d 1221 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (forfei-
ture violated Double Jeopardy Clause) and Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) (double jeopardy prohibited prosecution after forfeiture judgment) and State v. 392
South 600 East, 886 P.2d 534 (Utah 1994) (Austin dictates forfeiture is punishment).
Those state courts not finding double jeopardy violations rely on Halper and judge forfei-
tures case by case to determine if they are indeed remedial.
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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II. THE COURT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CHALLENGE TO § 881
A. The Halper and Austin Decisions
The Supreme Court first recognized that a civil penalty could
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v. Halper.8 In
that case, the defendant had submitted sixty-five false claims to
Medicare, thereby violating the criminal false claims statute.19 Af-
ter conviction, the United States then sought relief under the Civil
False Claims Act, which allowed for a statutory penalty of more
than $130,000 because of the number of violations." The Court
held that a civil penalty, which in part "serves the twin aims of
retribution and deterrence,"21 punishes, and that "under the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause a defendant who has already been punished
in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional
civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not be
fairly characterized as remedial."22 The Court remanded for an
opportunity for the government to present the district court with
an accounting of actual costs arising from Halper's fraud and to
recover for the costs it could demonstrate.'
Several years later, the Court decided Austin v. United States.4
In that case, the government initiated civil forfeiture proceedings
under sections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7) to confiscate a body shop
and mobile home linked with the defendant's cocaine activity. The
defendant had already pled guilty to criminal charges and sought
to have the forfeiture action dismissed, arguing that forfeiture
would be an unduly harsh punishment and would violate the Ex-
18 490 U.S. 455 (1989).
19 Id. at 437. Halper had filed fraudulent claims for reimbursements from Medicare
for services rendered as manager of a medical laboratory. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), prohibits "mak[ing] or present[ing] ... any claim upon or
against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to
be false, fictitious, or fraudulent."
20 Halper, 490 U.S. at 438. The statute allowed for civil penalties when one "know-
ingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved." Id.
21 Id. at 448.
22 Id. at 44849.
23 Id. at 452.
24 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 5 The Court held
that forfeiture sought under sections 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) is pun-
ishment, regardless of the actual costs to the government, because
of the lack of any rational relationship between the value of con-
veyances and real estate to the government's costs of prosecuting
the action. 6 Despite the civil nature of forfeiture, the Court not-
ed that the sections punish because they serve in part the policies
of retribution and deterrence and remanded the excessiveness
issue to the district court.2 7
These two decisions have provided the ammunition for de-
fendants to argue that double jeopardy applies to forfeiture under
section 881 if a criminal conviction has already been obtained: "it
does not require much imagination to see the problem. Civil and
criminal proceedings are not only docketed separately but also
tried separately, and under the double jeopardy clause separate
trials are anathema."28 Hence, these decisions set the stage for
potential double jeopardy preclusion of section 881 forfeiture. The
issue has since divided the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
B. The Double Jeopardy Framework
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment29 pro-
vides that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.""° The Clause is not lim-
ited to penalties which literally implicate "life or limb"; it also ap-
plies to imprisonment and monetary penalties." This Section ex-
amines the protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause,
and the variations of the protections that are most likely relevant
to assessing the constitutionality of section 881 forfeiture.
25 Id. at 2803.
26 Id. at 2812. For a more thorough analysis of the Austin decision, see infra notes
189-97 and accompanying text.
27 Id.
28 United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994).
29 "While the Clause itself simply states that no person shall 'be subject for the
same offense to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb,' the decisional law in the area
is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial
navigator." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
30 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Fx parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1874).
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1. Double Jeopardy's Multiple Punishment Prong
The "Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct
abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
multiple punishments for the same offense." 2 Civil forfeiture ar-
guably implicates all three prongs. Whether civil forfeiture
amounts to a successive "prosecution," however, is unclear. In
Helvering v. Mitchel43 Justice Brandeis wrote that the Double
Jeopardy Clause "prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a
second time to punish criminally, for the same offense. "s The
Justice's distinction between "punishing" and attempting to "pun-
ish criminally" may mean that a civil penalty can be punishment,
but not criminal punishment or prosecution. 5 Even if not the
only applicable prong, the multiple punishment prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause seems to be the most likely limit on seek-
ing concurrent criminal and civil penalties for criminal narcotics
violations.
The multiple punishment prong applies to two different situa-
tions: attempts to impose cumulative punishments in the same
proceeding and attempts to impose multiple punishments in suc-
cessive proceedings. 8 When the government seeks to impose mul-
tiple punishments in the same trial, the inquiry is "whether the
32 Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969)); see also United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2855 (1993) (applies to succes-
sive prosecutions and multiple punishments).
33 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
34 Id. at 399.
35 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 443 (discussion of Brandeis's omission of the adverb
"criminally" from the multiple punishment prohibition).
It should be noted that if civil forfeiture proceedings are not "prosecutions," pre-
sumably the government could seek civil forfeiture even though the defendant is acquit-
ted of criminal charges and could seek conviction after a failed or purely remedial forfei-
ture action. See infra Part V. In other words, if the civil forfeiture proceeding is not a
prosecution, the government has more freedom to seek both punishments because dou-
ble jeopardy's first two prongs would not apply. But see infra text accompanying note 105
(Supreme Court holding that tax proceeding following criminal prosecution equivalent to
second prosecution); note 228.
36 For the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude multiple punish-
ments in separate proceedings, but only multiple prosecutions, see Department of Reve-
nue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-59 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Court's ad-
vancement of multiple-punishment-in-separate-proceedings theory in Halper based on mis-
reading of precedent; multiple punishment prong merely requires that cumulative punish-
ments in same proceeding be legislatively authorized). This Note accepts Halpeys formu-
lation and does not attempt to determine the historical validity of its proclamation.
1995]
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legislature actually authorized the cumulative punishment."7 Be-
cause the legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and
punishments, the underlying policy in these cases is to insure that
the legislature intended cumulative punishments.'
In contrast, when multiple punishments are sought in separate
proceedings, "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the
possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment
because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first
proceeding." 9 Other policy rationales can be advanced for the
prohibition, including those policy concerns underlying the prohi-
bition of successive prosecutions such as the interests of finality,
immunity from being subjected to ongoing harassment, and fair-
ness by preventing the government from perfecting its case until
ultimately successful.'
2. The "Same Offense" Requirement
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishing twice for the
"same offense."41 Otherwise, a conviction for burglary could bar a
prosecution for murder ten years later. The Court set forth the
seminal test for determining whether two offenses are the "same"
for double jeopardy purposes in Blockburger v. United States-2 "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
37 Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10. The government can "seek[] and obtain[] both the
full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the
same proceeding." Id. at 450.
38 See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
493, 500 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 368-69 (1983); Albernaz v. Unit-
ed States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
Because this Note contends that civil and criminal proceedings are not the "same
proceeding," no attempt is made to determine whether the legislature intended cumula-
tive punishments in this area. It is probably safe to assume, however, that Congress did
indeed intend to allow both penalties for drug crimes. See supra note 8 (legislative history
indicates Congress intended to make drug trade prohibitively costily); infra note 195.
39 Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10.
40 For an example of the importance of considering the policy reasons behind the
Double Jeopardy Clause, see Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977) (no viola-
tion when defendant elects to have two offenses tried separately because "the policy be-
hind the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require prohibition of the second trial").
41 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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does not."4"
The Court subsequently clarified the test in Brown v. Ohio"
to protect against the separate prosecutions of greater and lesser
included offenses. In Brown the government attempted to prose-
cute the defendant for auto theft after he had pled guilty to the
offense of joyriding.45 "Joyriding" was essentially defined as oper-
ating another's motor vehicle without consent, while "auto theft"
was defined as stealing a motor vehicle.46 Therefore, joyriding was
a lesser included offense of auto theft because a stolen vehicle is
necessarily operated without the owner's consent. Because all the
elements of joyriding are automatically satisfied by proving all the
elements of auto theft," each offense does not "require[] proof
of a fact which the other does not."" In sum, greater and lesser
included offenses are the same offense under Blockburger.
3. The "Species of Lesser Included Offense" and Incorporation
Offenses may be described as greater included only if it is
necessary to prove all of the elements of the lesser included of-
fense to establish a violation of the greater included. A "species of
lesser included offense" exists when the offense is broadly incor-
porated within another offense and is used to prove a violation of
the greater included offense, even though the government could
have proven the greater offense without reference to the specific
lesser offense at issue. For example,. felony murder statutes incor-
porate all of the violent felonies within their language, but only
those violent felonies actually used to support a felony murder
conviction are actually lesser included. These "species" are neces-
sarily the "same offense" under Blockburger and may not be pun-
43 Id. at 304.
44 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
45 Id. at 162-63.
46 Id.
47 The dispositive inquiry is whether the statutory eements overlap, not whether the
same facts or conduct are used to prove the elements. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S.
Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) ("same conduct"
test)); lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (noting that Blockburger
can be satisfied "notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish
the crimes"); see also United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1383-85 (1993).
48 Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932)). An apparent exception to the rule in Brown is separate prosecutions for conspir-
acy and the underlying criminal offense. See Felix 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) (unique and in-
tricate nature of conspiracy laws historically precludes application of Brown in this con-
text).
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ished after punishing the greater included offense separately, and
vice versa.
The above example derives from Harris v. Oklahoma.49 The
defendant in that case was convicted of robbery with firearms after
he had been convicted of felony murder. The robbery had been
used to establish intent in the trial for felony murder. Because the
government had found it necessary to rely on the elements of the
robbery offense to predicate the felony murder conviction, the
Court held that the subsequent prosecution for the robbery of-
fense was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.5" Presumably, if
the state would have used a different felony as the predicate of-
fense for felony murder in the first trial, the subsequent prosecu-
tion for robbery with firearms would not have been barred.
The Court further developed this doctrine in Illinois v.
Vitale," a case in which the respondent had pled guilty to the
charge of "failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident" arising
out of events resulting in the deaths of two children. Following
the plea, the government charged Vitale with involuntary man-
slaughter, which required the government to prove that, inter alia,
Vitale "recklessly" operated a motor vehicle. 2 Although the gov-
ernment could prove the elements of the "failing to reduce speed"
offense to establish recklessness, the Court remanded for a deter-
mination of whether the government actually intended to do so."3
The subsequent prosecution would be permissible if another of-
fense was to be used to establish recklessness. On the other hand,
if the government relied on the elements of the "failing to reduce
speed" offense to establish involuntary manslaughter, the offense
could be viewed as a "species of lesser-included offense,"54 consti-
tuting the "same offense" under Blockburger5
A different yet related situation arose in United States v.
Dixon, 6 where the incorporation of a criminal statute within a
civil protection order resulted in the Court invalidating a subse-
quent attempt to prosecute under that criminal statute. In Dixon
the defendant was convicted for criminal contempt for violating a
49 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
50 Id. at 682.
51 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
52 Id. at 413 n.4.
53 Id. at 421.
54 Id. at 420.
55 See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992) (discussing Vitale).
56 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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civil protection order which prohibited the defendant from violat-
ing the drug laws. The Court held that the government could not
subsequently proceed to prosecute the defendant on the drug law
violation because the drug offense was incorporated within the
contempt conviction.57 However, the Court found that the gov-
ernment was not precluded from prosecuting the defendant in a
consolidated case for assault with intent to kill even though the
defendant had been convicted of criminal contempt for violating
an order which incorporated assault within its terms. Because
"assault with intent to kill" requires proof of specific intent to kill
and "assault" does not, the charge of assault with intent to kill was
not fully incorporated within the civil protection order. And be-
cause contempt requires knowledge of the order (whereas assault
with intent to kill does not), while assault with intent to kill re-
quires specific intent to kill (whereas violation of the protective
order does not), the offenses were not the "same offense."58
These results can be viewed as the effects of incorporation. If
a group of offenses is incorporated within another offense, any of-
fense out of that group which is actually used to secure a con-
viction of the greater included offense is a "species of lesser in-
cluded offense" and the same for double jeopardy purposes. These
cases demonstrate that provisions which incorporate within their
wording other criminal statutes may, in certain circumstances,
become greater included offenses of the latter.
III. RESOLUTION: IS THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE VIOLATED?
The resolution of the double jeopardy issue requires the ex-
amination of three distinct issues. First, it must be determined
whether section 881 proceedings are "separate" from criminal tri-
als, or whether the government can escape constitutional preclu-
sion by resorting to the legal fiction of a "single, coordinated
prosecution." Second, although receiving little attention from the
courts, it is important to determine whether section 881 forfeiture
is or punishes the same underlying offenses as criminal narcotics
statutes. If the two can be characterized as separate offenses, dou-
ble jeopardy concerns give way to questions of whether collateral
estoppel may preclude the relitigation of issues already deter-
mined. Finally, independent of the outcome of the first two issues,
57 Id. at 2858.
58 Id. at 2858-59.
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section 881 (a) (6) forfeiture may escape preclusion if it does not
amount to punishment under Austin.
Some of these issues have been considered by the U.S. Courts
of Appeals. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have had occasion to consider whether drug asset civil forfei-
ture implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause.59 In the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, the panels held that double jeopardy is not
implicated by parallel civil and criminal proceedings, including
civil proceedings which are brought under sections 881 (a) (4) and
(a) (7).' The Fifth Circuit's position is that Austin's analysis does
not apply to section 881 (a) (6) because the section includes within
its coverage the proceeds of illegal drug activity and is therefore
not punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.61
The Ninth Circuit has explicitly disagreed with its sister
courts' interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause by finding a
violation when criminal and civil sanctions are pursued together."
The Seventh Circuit, in dicta, appears to agree with the Ninth.'
A. Are Civil and Criminal Proceedings "Single"
or "Separate" Proceedings?
1. The Second, Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
The Second Circuit has held that the multiple punishment
prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by impos-
ing cumulative civil and criminal sanctions because both sanctions
are imposed in what is the functional equivalent of a single pro-
ceeding.' In United States v. Millan,s the court considered a case
59 Prior to Austin, the position of several U.S. Circuit Courts was that civil forfeiture
pursuant to § 881 did not constitute punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo,
995 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1992) (for-
feiture is primarily remedial); United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (§ 881(a)(6) is remedial); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st
Cir. 1989) (forfeiture is remedial and nonpunitive because "[tihe ravages of drugs upon
our nation and the billions the government is being forced to spend upon investigation
and enforcement-not to mention the costs of drug-related crime and drug abuse treat-
ment, rehabilitation, and prevention-easily justify a recovery in excess of the strict value
of the property actually [involved]."). These decisions, however, employ analysis explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
60 See infra Part III.A.1.
61 See infra Part IV.A.
62 See infra Parts III.A.1, IV.
63 See infra note 92; notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
64 This holding would apparently foreclose any problem with the "subsequent prose-
cution" prongs of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well since there would be but one
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in which the defendants had agreed to forfeit money, real estate
and business interests in return for an agreement from the gov-
ernment to release certain assets to the defendants (to cover legal
expenses) and to dismiss the civil suit.l The defendants argued
that because forfeiture had preceded the criminal trial, the indict-
ment should be dismissed.' Though Millan was decided within
two months of Austin, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether section 881 forfeitures were punishment because the "gov-
ernment has employed a single proceeding to prosecute the [de-
fendants], and, therefore, the proscription of the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply."' The court held that the civil forfeiture
suit was part of "a single, coordinated prosecution,"69 relying on
the following factors: (1) the warrants authorizing arrest and the
warrants authorizing seizure were issued on the same day by the
same judge, (2) the warrants were based on the same affidavit, (3)
the civil complaint incorporated the criminal indictment, and (4)
the defendants were aware that the government was pursuing both
remedies."' The court found especially relevant the defendants'
awareness of both actions. Noting that one of the policy concerns
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the "government
might act abusively by seeking a second punishment when it is
dissatisfied with the [first] punishment," the court reasoned the
concern was missing in the case where contemporaneous actions
made it "clear to all parties that the government intended to pur-
sue all available civil and criminal remedies."7
Because the classification of forfeiture as punishment is irrel-
evant to the Second Circuit's analysis, Millan survives Austin. In
fact, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has
so held. In United States v. 77 East 3rd Street,72 the defendants pled
proceeding (prosecution). For a discussion of the various prongs of the Clause, see supra
notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
65 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
66 Id. at 19.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 20.
70 Id. The court found the fact that the actions were filed separately with different
docket numbers irrelevant "[C]ourts must look past the [federal] procedural require-
ments [that civil and criminal suits be filed and docketed separately] and examine the
essence of the actions at hand by determining when, how, and why the civil and criminal
actions were initiated." Id.
71 Id. at 20-21.
72 No. 85 CIV. 3351 (SS), 1994 WL 4288 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,"1994).
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guilty to federal drug law violations and then faced civil proceed-
ings, pursuant to section 881 (a) (7), which sought to forfeit their
residence. The court held that, notwithstanding Austin, the "forfei-
ture here would not contravene the Double Jeopardy Clause since
this action and the prior criminal prosecutions against the [defen-
dants] are part of a single proceeding."7 ' The court relied on
four factors derived directly from Millan: (1) the warrants for
arrest and seizure were based on the same affidavit and issued the
same day by the same judge, (2) the civil complaint incorporated
the criminal indictment, (3) the criminal indictment mentioned
that the property was involved in drug law violations, and (4) the
defendants were aware of both proceedings. 4 Although the two
actions were not contemporaneous due "in large part" to the gov-
ernment seeking stays until the resolution of the criminal action,
the court found the delay irrelevant since the delay was not a
"retaliatory action by the Government for insufficient punishment
in the criminal action."'75 The court therefore applied the policy
analysis of Millan to extend the "single, coordinated prosecution"
formulation to include proceedings that take place several years
apart. Taking the Second Circuit's cue, the court examined prose-
cutorial intent and determined that no policy concern was impli-
cated. 6
Following Austin, the Eleventh Circuit employed the Millan
analysis in United States v. 18755 North Bay Road." Prosecutors ac-
cused the defendants in North Bay Road of various gambling offens-
es and seized personal property as well as the defendants'
home. After the conviction of the defendants, the government
was granted summary judgment in the civil proceeding against the
real property.7 9 In response to the defendants' contention that
the civil forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the court
considered Halper and Austin. Noting that "l[t] here is no question
that the same conduct" provided the basis for both sanctions,80
the court held that Halper does not "prevent the Government
73 Id. at *3.
74 Id. at *2.
75 Id. at *3.
76 See also United States v. Smith, 874 F. Supp. 347, 350 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (finding
"single, coordinated prosecution" after noting that the prosecution was not abusively seek-
ing second punishment because of dissatisfaction with the first).
77 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
78 Id. at 1494-95.
79 Id. at 1495. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988) (forfeiture statute for gambling activity).
80 North Bay Rd., 13 F.3d at 1499.
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from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full
range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same pro-
ceeding."" The court adopted the Millan test: "[W]e find that
the circumstances of the simultaneous pursuit by the government
of criminal and civil sanctions against [the defendants] ... falls
within the contours of a single, coordinated prosecution." 2
North Bay Road undoubtedly would apply to forfeitures sought
under section 881. Even if section 881 forfeiture is punishment,
assuming the four factors of Millan are met, it is punishment that
is sought to be imposed in what can be described as a "single,
coordinated prosecution." The court's approval of Millan also indi-
cates the decision would apply in the context of drug asset civil
forfeiture. In fact, in United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane,8" a dis-
trict court in the Eleventh Circuit relied upon North Bay Road to
uphold the forfeiture of certain real estate pursuant to section
881 (a) (7).
On September 6, 1994, in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency,84 the Ninth Circuit became the first U.S. Court of Ap-
peals to squarely hold that, as a result of Austin, forfeitures under
section 881(a) (6) violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when cou-
pled with criminal proceedings. 6 In $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,
the goyernment had instituted the civil action five days after the
grand jury indicted the defendant."' The holding of the court
resulted from two independent findings,' the first of which is
81 Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989)). The court also
cited with approval Millan for its discussion of the multiple punishment prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
82 Id. The court also examined prosecutorial intent to arrive at its conclusion. The
court noted that, as in Millan, "there is no problem here that the government acted abu-
sively by seeking a second punishment because of dissatisfaction with the punishment
levied in the first action." Id. The court cited Halper for the proposition that the multiple
punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause, in the context of a single proceeding,
is singularly concerned with whether the legislature authorized all of the punishment to
be imposed. Id.
83 872 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
84 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
85 The decision would apply equally to bar forfeitures sought under §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) because of Austin's clear holding that those sections constitute punishment.
86 On September 2, 1994, a district court in Washington held that criminal convic-
tion following § 881(a) (7) forfeiture violated double jeopardy. United States v. McCaslin,
863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
87 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1214.
88 Arguably, the Ninth Circuit's decision depends on three findings: (1) the forfei-
ture is punishment, (2) for the same offense, (3) in a separate proceeding. Though the
"same offense" requirement was virtually ignored in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, in a subse-
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relevant here. The court found that the civil and criminal actions
were separate proceedings because "two separate actions, one civil
and one criminal, instituted at different times, tried at different
times before different factfinders, presided over by different dis-
trict judges, and resolved by separate judgments [do not] consti-
tute the same 'proceeding.'"8" The court explicitly rejected the
"single, coordinated prosecution" formulation of Millan and North
Bay Road."
The court also disagreed with its sister courts over whether
the policy concerns underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause sup-
port dual proceedings. The court noted that, by allowing prosecu-
tors to first obtain a conviction in criminal proceedings (beyond a
reasonable doubt standard) before seeking civil forfeiture (pre-
ponderance of evidence standard), the government obtained a
"significant advantage."9 This analysis stands in contrast to the
fairness and prosecutorial intent analysis the courts in Millan and
North Bay Road used to support their opposite conclusion. 2
2. The Better View: Criminal and Civil Proceedings are "Separate
Proceedings"
Conceptually, it is hard to imagine what would fall within the
definition of "separate proceedings" if parallel criminal and civil
proceedings do not. Common sense dictates that "two separate
actions, one civil and one criminal ... resolved by separate judg-
quent decision, United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir.
1994), the court remanded so that the district court could determine whether "the gov-
ernment seeks to punish [the defendant] for the same offense for which he was crimi-
nally prosecuted." Id. at 495 (case concerned the forfeiture of an aircraft pursuant to §
881 (a) (4)). See also Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 823-24 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(criminal. conviction under § 841(a) (1) is lesser included offense of §§ 881(a) (6) and
(a) (7)).
89 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. The court found that the "same pro-
ceeding" requirement would have been satisfied by seeking both remedies within the
same indictment at the same trial. Id. Accord United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp.
791, 796 (D. Or. 1994).
90 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216 ("[W]e believe that the position
adopted by the Second and Eleventh Circuits contradicts controlling Supreme Court pre-
cedent as well as common sense." (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Jeffers
v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977))).
91 Id. at 1217.
92 Although dicta, it appears the Seventh Circuit currently agrees with the Ninth
that parallel § 881(a)(6) and criminal proceedings run afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See United States v. Tortes, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994); see also United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Torres cited for the proposition that "double jeopardy applies to civil forfeiture").
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ments[] constitute" separate proceedings.9" The two actions are
governed by different rules of procedure94 and sometimes must
be brought in different jurisdictions. 5 Embracing a test which at-
tempts to distinguish between "single" and "separate" proceedings,
yet ignores these fundamental differences, will inevitably produce
unjust results for future claimants.
Section 881 itself implies that civil forfeiture is independent of
criminal prosecution by providing that the "filing of an indictment
or information alleging a [criminal] violation .. .related to a civil
forfeiture proceeding... shall, upon motion... stay the civil
forfeiture proceeding."5 Because of the delays and administrative
problems that resulted from maintaining separate civil and crimi-
nal actions, Congress eventually provided for criminal forfeiture in
1984."' Criminal forfeiture was designed to allow for the simulta-
neous resolution of all claims against the individual and property
because "Itihe problem with civil forfeiture is that even if the
same facts that are at issue in a criminal trial are also dispositive
of the forfeiture issue, it is still necessary for the government, in
93 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. "Separate" can be defined as
"[i]ndividual; distinct; particular, disconnected ... impl[ying] division ... [or] discon-
nection." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1364 (6th ed. 1990). "The word [proceeding] may be
used synonymously with 'action' or 'suit' to describe the entire course of an action at law
or a suit in equity from the issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint until the en-
try of final judgment . . . ." Id. at 1204; see also id. at 1385 (defining "single" as "[o]ne
only"). Criminal and civil proceedings are "distinct suits," one initiated by the "filing of a
complaint" and the other resulting from the "issuance of" an indictment, that result in
more than one "entry of final judgment." See infra note 120 and accompanying text; see
also Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 983, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (forfeiture is
proceeding separate from criminal prosecution notwithstanding administrative nature of
forfeiture proceeding).
94 Section 881 seizures are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). The
proceedings themselves are governed by the customs laws, id. § 881(d), and are also "os-
tensibly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," United States v. 632-636
Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1992). Criminal proceedings, on the
other hand, are governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
95 "Since civil forfeiture is an in rein proceeding, the forfeiture case must be brought
in the judicial district in which the property is located. The property is the defendant in
the case . . . ." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3376.
96 21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (1988).
97 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Star. 2044 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Congress implemented drug
asset civil forfeiture beginning in 1970. Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
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addition to the criminal case, to file a separate civil suit.""8 Con-
gress itself therefore envisioned two separate proceedings to com-
bat narcotics violations. Although Congress's view does not bind
the judiciary, this is the common sense view: if two criminal trials
for the same illegal narcotics activity are "separate" proceedings,'
then parallel civil and criminal proceedings, which have less in
common with each other, are realistically "separate" and should be
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause if both punish the same
offense.
In addition to contravening common sense, viewing parallel
civil and criminal proceedings as a single proceeding seems to
"contradict[] controlling Supreme Court precedent."'00 In Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,'0' the Court invalidated a tax im-
posed on the possession of marijuana as violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against successive punishments for
the same offense. The Court found that the tax, which was pur-
sued in conjunction with a criminal prosecution that included a
possession charge, was punitive in nature. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens wrote that the arrest of the defendants "gave rise
to four separate legal proceedings:" (1) a proceeding where "the
State filed criminal charges against all six respondents," (2) "a civil
forfeiture action seeking recovery of cash and equipment," (3) a
"third proceeding involv[ing] the assessment of the new tax on
dangerous drugs," and (4) a "fourth legal proceeding" initiated by
the Kurths for bankruptcy. 1 2 The Court concluded that "Mon-
tana no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana,
for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for the
same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the same
98 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3379 (emphasis added). The committee further noted that where the property of
the defendant of the "criminal case is located in more than one judicial district, a sepa-
rate civil forfeiture suit must be filed in each of these districts." Id. at 3380 (emphasis
added) (noting that the solution to the problem is to "permit prosecutors the option of
pursuing a criminal forfeiture in which the forfeiture action can be consolidated with the
prosecution of the offense giving rise to forfeiture").
99 See generally Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 908 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (describing defendant's two murder trials as "separate proceed-
ings"). Prosecuting the "same offense" in separate trials is forbidden by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam); Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U.S. 137, 151 (1977).
100 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994).
101 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
102 Id. at 1942-43.
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proceeding that resulted in his conviction."103 The Court, though
appearing to rely on the multiple punishment prong of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause, ' went further, describing the tax proceed-
ing as "the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecu-
tion that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the
same offence."" 5
Although Stevens's statement that civil forfeture is a "separate
legal proceeding" is dicta, the opinion did implicitly hold that the
subsequent tax proceeding was separate. The Court declined to
view the various proceedings against the Kurths as parts of a "sin-
gle, coordinated prosecution." Contrary to Millan's view that paral-
lel proceedings can be functionally the same proceeding, Kurth
Ranch squarely holds that second proceedings which are punitive
in nature are functionally the same as "successive prosecutions."
Halpe? 6 itself, relied upon in Kurth Ranch,"7 seems to re-
ject the "single, coordinated prosecution" theory of Millan. The
government in Halper, after convicting Halper for sixty-five viola-
tions of the criminal false claims statute,0 8 attempted to obtain a
civil penalty under the Civil False Claims Act."° Summary judg-
ment was awarded based in part on the criminal conviction.110
The Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defen-
dant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution
103 Id. at 1945.
104 See, e.g., id. at 1948 ("[I]t is a second punishment within the contemplation of a
constitutional protection that has 'deep roots in our history and jurisprudence,' and
therefore must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all." (quoting United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989))); id at 1947 n.21 ("Nor does the statute re-
quire us to comment on the permissibility of 'multiple punishments' imposed in the
same proceeding since [the statute] involves separate sanctions imposed in successive pro-
ceedings.").
105 Id. at 1948. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, foreseeing the problem at
hand, questioned whether Kurth Ranch's holding would forbid the subsequent prosecution
of a defendant who had already been subjected to forfeiture for the same violation. Id.
at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994)).
106 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). For more discussion of Halper, see
supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
107 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944 (stating that in Halper, the government "filed
a separate action to recover a $2,000 civil penalty for each .. .violation[]"); see also id.
at 1945 ("A defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a
nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate pro-
ceeding." (citing Halper, 490 U.S. 435))).
108 Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
109 Id. at 438.
110 Id. at 438, 441 n.4.
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may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent
that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as reme-
dial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.""' Implicit in that
holding is the Court's determination that civil and criminal actions
are inherently separate. Throughout the opinion, Justice Blackmun
distinguishes between the "instant proceeding" and "the prior
criminal proceeding."". No discussion is given to the possibility
of construing the two proceedings as a functional unit. The Court
takes the common sense view that civil and criminal actions, with
their plethora of differences," 3 are inherently "separate proceed-
ings. ' ')1
4
An examination of Halper and Kurth Ranch reveals that the
Millan court, in an attempt to preserve legislative intent and the
continued viability of civil forfeiture, developed an unworkable test
that exalts form over substance, thereby "whitewash[ing] the dou-
ble jeopardy [issue] by affording constitutional significance to the
label 'single, coordinated prosecution."" The factors relied up-
on in Millan are wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether civil and
criminal proceedings are separate. The first three-the arrest and
forfeiture warrants being issued on the same day, both warrants
being based on the same affidavit, and the civil complaint being
incorporated within the indictment-are all preproceeding consid-
erations. For instance, if the defendant in Brown would have been
prosecuted in separate trials for auto theft and joyriding, a double
jeopardy violation would have occurred notwithstanding all of
Millan's conditions being satisfied. The government could issue
arrest warrants for both offenses the same day based on the same
affidavit and incorporate each offense within each indictment. But
if the government then were to proceed to separately try each
case on separate indictments in front of different juries, thereby
111 Id. at 448-49.
112 Id. at 441; see also id. at 443 ("'[Plunishment' indeed may arise from either crimi-
nal or civil proceedings."); id. at 451 ("[T]he Government may not criminally prosecute a
defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a separate civil ac-
tion .. . .").
113 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; infra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
114 An alternative view is to take the Court's holding at face value; that is, one can-
not be punished civilly after a criminal conviction period. Under this view, it would be
irrelevant whether the two proceedings are functionally the same; dual civil and criminal
punishment is merely forbidden. Such a reading, however, has no basis in reason. Crimi-
nal and civil proceedings must inherently be separate for the Court's holding to make
sense from a double jeopardy standpoint.
115 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1217 (9th Cir. 1994).
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obtaining two separate verdicts, few would argue that double jeop-
ardy was not offended. Millan's final factor, the defendant's
awareness of the government's intention to obtain two verdicts,
would likewise be constitutionally irrelevant as long as the defen-
dant did not consent to separate trials."'
These cases suggest several alternative tests that could be used
to distinguish between single and separate proceedings. A single
proceeding logically consists of one legal action in which all per-
sonal and property claims are heard and decided before the same
finder of fact. In other words, the actions imposing punishment
occur in the "same proceeding" if, for example, they are "brought
in the same indictment and tried at the same time."" 7 Without
deciding the ultimate validity of the "same indictment" test,'11 it
is enough for the purposes of this Note that criminal and civil
proceedings are always separate proceedings.' They are simply
different in nature: initiated by different procedures, 2 ' governed
116 See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152, 154 (1977) (holding that separate
trials of greater and lesser included offenses that would otherwise offend double jeopardy
are valid if defendant consents to such treatment).
Another exception where lesser and greater included offenses may be tried separate-
ly is where "the facts necessary to the greater were not discovered despite the exercise of
due diligence before the first trial." Id. at 152.
117 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216.
118 Seeking multiple punishments under the same indictment at the same trial is per-
missible, but perhaps not required by the Double Jeopardy Clause. To say that the gov-
ernment can pass the "same proceeding" test by following the Ninth Circuit's suggestion
does not mean that the government must pursue all remedies under the same indictment
or be precluded.
Technically, the charges would not have to be brought in the same indictment so
long as both indictments were charged and prosecuted in the same trial. Cf Jeffers, 432
U.S. at 154 n.23 (indicating that two indictments being tried together requires an exami-
nation of legislative intent to determine if cumulative punishment is intended).
119 People v. Towns, Nos. 2-93-1376, 2-94-0111, 1995 WL 77588, at *8 (Ill. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 1995) (opinion yet to be released and subject to withdrawal). Courts routinely
speak of the two proceedings as if they are separate. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel,
397 U.S. 1, 11, 12 & n.27 (1970) (implying that civil proceedings and criminal prosecu-
tions are distinct); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965)
(discussing admissibility of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings); United States v.
One 1977 Pontiac Grand Prix, 483 F. Supp. 48, 49 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (civil penalty is "en-
tirely separate from the criminal case"); United States v. One 1967 Buick Hardtop Elec-
tra, 304 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (W.D. Pa. 1969); see also Milton Pollack, Parallel Civil and
Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201 (1990).
120 A forfeiture action is initiated by the filing of a complaint. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(1988). An expedited forfeiture action may be initiated by the United States Attorney
General in lieu of filing a complaint if certain conditions are met. Id. In contrast, crimi-
nal actions are initiated by an indictment or information. U.S. CONST. amend. V; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(a); see generally Timothy H. Gillis, Preliminary Proceedings: Indictments, 78 GEO.
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separately by the Bill of Rights,"' overseen by distinct discovery
and procedural rules,"' resolved by independent factual determi-
nations, usually heard before different fact-finders, 24 assigned
different docket numbers, resolved by different standards of
proof," and initiated against different parties,2 one human
and one inanimate. The timing of the two actions, whether simul-
taneous or nonconcurrent, bears on the ultimate fairness of the
result, but does not affect whether the proceedings are distinct
any more than trying the defendant in Harris for auto theft and
joyriding concurrently in separate trials would have.12 1 Any alter-
L.J. 888 (1990).
121 For example, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures has been held to apply to civil forfeiture proceedings, while the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause has been held to not apply. See Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804-05 n.4 (1993) (comparing which constitutional protections
apply to civil and criminal proceedings and noting that whether a constitutional provision
applies generally depends on the wording of the constitutional amendment involved).
122 See supra note 94.
123 Collateral estoppel may, in certain situations, be applied to preclude differing
factual determinations in civil suits that follow acquittals. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938) (stating that while normally the differing standards of proof pre-
clude the application of collateral estoppel in the civil suit, "[wihere the objective of the
subsequent action likewise is punishment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain the
second proceeding for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy").
The very possibility of the application of collateral estoppel proves the proceedings are
distinct since the application of the doctrine necessarily depends on there being "separate
proceedings."
124 If the same judge were fortuitously to be assigned to the civil and the criminal
case, a different result would not be forthcoming. The judge would be a separate fact
finder, required to make independent factual determinations. See, e.g., Watkins v. Murray,
493 U.S. 907, 908 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (referring to
defendant's two murder trials as "separate proceedings" although "[the same judge pre-
sided at both trials").
125 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; cf. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 397 (noting
that civil and criminal cases are "different in nature" because of the 'difference in de-
gree of the burden of proof"); Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sentencing enhancement proceeding not same for double jeopardy purposes because of
different standard of proof applied in proceeding), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 907 (1990).
126 See supra note 6. "'[Tlhe proceeding in rein stands independent of, and wholly
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.'" Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15
(1827), and considering Puerto Rico's drug asset forfeiture provision which is modeled
after § 881).
127 But see United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.
1994) (fact that civil and criminal proceedings are "instituted at different times" weighs
in favor of determination that the two are separate proceedings); Oakes v. United States,
872 F. Supp. 817, 824-25 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (applying $405,089.23 U.S. Currency and cit-
ing the fact that forfeiture judgment was not entered until nearly ten months after con-
viction as weighing in favor of finding double jeopardy violation).
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nate interpretation of "separate proceedings" contorts the meaning
of the words to a point where no two proceedings could defini-
tively or logically be described as "separate."
B. Do the Civil Forfeiture and Substantive Narcotics Statutes Punish
the "Same Offense"?
Although yet to receive much attention from the courts, a
determination that the section 881 "offense" and the substantive
criminal offense are the "same offense" is necessary for double
jeopardy principles to apply.'28 If they are the same offense, dou-
ble jeopardy could forbid the resolution of the two in separate
proceedings." The appropriate test to apply in this regard is
found in Blockburger and its progeny. 3 The test requires an ex-
amination of the elements of each offense to determine whether
each requires proof of an element the other does not.
On its face, section 881 appears to require proof of elements
not required in criminal prosecutions for violations of, for exam-
ple, sections 841 and 844.1" Forfeiture under section 881, for in-
128 See supra Parts II.B.2-3. But cf United States v. Rural Route 1, Mound Rd., No. 90
C 4722, 1994 WL 48618, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1994) ("Criminal forfeiture is simply an
element of punishment upon conviction of the substantive crime and is not a substantive
offense itself.").
Route 1, Mound Rd.'s statement, however, deals with criminal forfeiture, which is
more easily characterized as mere punishment for the offense already being tried in the
proceeding. Cf Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (holding that capital sentenc-
ing procedure resembling trial on issue of guilt or innocence violates double jeopardy
when following jury verdict fixing punishment at life imprisonment). To say civil forfei-
ture is merely an element of punishment for the substantive crime begs the questions,
"Which crime and is it the same crime as the one that has been prosecuted?" This Sec-
tion attempts to answer these questions. In sum, the double jeopardy implications should
remain the same regardless of whether one views § 881 as an offense itself or as pun-
ishing for an offense because the two occur in separate proceedings.
129 For' more on whether the order of the proceedings affects the result, see infra
Part V.
130 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see supra Parts II.B.2-3.;
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993) ("In both the multiple punishment
and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where two offenses for
which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the 'same-elements' test, the
double jeopardy bar applies."). It could be argued that in the context of multiple punish-
ments, legislative intent controls and Blockburger is merely a tool of statutory construction.
See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Hunter, however, concerns multiple punish-
ments in one proceeding.
131 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (1988). Section 841 (a) provides that "it shall be un-
lawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance." Id. § 841(a) (1). Section 844(a) proscribes knowingly or intentionally possessing a
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stance, requires proof of the fact that property had a nexus with
illegal drug activity.'32 Most of the substantive drug offenses, on
the other hand, do not require that conveyances, pieces of real
property or proceeds be involved (used, facilitated, etc.) in the il-
legal drug activity. Therefore, section 881 does require proof of an
element that the criminal statutes do not. Blockburger and Brown,
however, require that the criminal statutes demand proof of an
element not required of civil forfeiture under section 881. Other-
wise, the substantive offense could be argued to be a lesser includ-
ed offense of section 881, and therefore susceptible to double
jeopardy attack.
1. Criminal Statutes Do Not Contain a Mens Rea Element Not
Required in § 881
One justification that has been offered for finding that crimi-
nal narcotics offenses are not lesser included offense of civil forfei-
ture is that the criminal statutes require criminal mens rea,133
while the civil statutes do not. In United States v. One 1977 Pontiac
Grand Prix,"3 the court held that a "forfeiture proceeding [under
§ 881(a) (4)] does not require proof of criminal intent.""5 The
court based its decision on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 136 a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture
of a innocent owner's yacht. In reaching its decision in that case,
the Court found that forfeiture is not based on specific criminal
intent, but instead could be understood as a "penalty for care-
lessness.""3 7 The Pontiac Grand Prix and other courts have read
this decision to mean that the mens rea for civil forfeiture is "neg-
ligence," punishing property owners for not "exercis[ing] greater
controlled substance. Id. § 844(a). Other criminal provisions include 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1988) (making illegal attempting or conspiring to commit any defined offense), 21
U.S.C. § 856 (1988) (covering the establishment of manufacturing operations knowingly
opened or maintained for purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using controlled
substances), and 21 U.S.C. § 858 (1988) (making illegal endangering human life while
illegally manufacturing a controlled substance).
132 Beyond the actual wording of § 881, see Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the
Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Propor-
tionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 249-51 (1994).
133 The mens rea requirement for criminal manufacturing, distributing, dispensing,
and possessing is "knowingly or intentionally." See supra note 131. The mens rea for "es-
tablishment of manufacturing operations" is "knowingly." 21 U.S.C. § 856 (1988).
134 483 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
135 Id. at 49.
136 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
137 Id. at 681; see also id. at 683, 685.
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care." ss Although appealing at first glance, the mens rea argu-
ment fails on several counts.
First, civil forfeiture is "tie[d] ... directly to the commission
of drug offenses." Therefore, in addition to the mens rea re-
quirement for section 881, which may indeed be a standard lower
than criminal state of mind,140 the statute incorporates the ele-
ments of the criminal statutes within its provisions. Furthermore,
the mens rea requirement in section 881 refers to an attendant
circumstance (whether an act or omission has been committed),
while the mens rea requirement found in the criminal statutes
refers to conduct (manufacturing, possessing, etc.)141 Simply stat-
ed, these mens rea requirements attach to different elements of
the statutes. Section 881, therefore, requires that the government
prove an additional mens rea requirement: that the claimant knew
or consented to the act giving rise to the forfeiture. In sum, this
argument helps to prove that section 881 requires the proof of an
element in addition to those found in the criminal statutes, but
fails to demonstrate that there is an element in the criminal stat-
utes not present in the civil. Because section 881 incorporates the
criminal statutes, the government usually must prove a violation of
criminal law as a predicate to forfeiture.' Along with proving a
criminal violation comes all of the elements of the violation, in-
cluding its mens rea requirements.
2. Criminal Drug Offenses and § 881 "Offenses" Are Not the
"Same Offenses" in All Cases
As previously noted, it can be argued that the various sub-
stantive drug offenses are lesser included offenses of forfeiture
because they are incorporated within the provisions of section
881. In Oakes v. United States,' the court dismissed the
138 Id. at 688.
139 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993); see supra notes 3-5.
140 The "mens rea" for civil forfeiture is found in the innocent owner's defenses.
Under the statute, property is exempt if the acts giving rise to the forfeiture occurred
without the owner's "knowledge or consent," 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6), (a)(7)
(1988), or "willful blindness," id § 881(a)(4)(C).
The Circuits do not treat the defenses uniformly. Some treat "knowledge or con-
sent" as criminal state of mind. Others treat the standard as essentially a negligence
standard (should have known). See Franze, Note, supra note 6, at 390-94 (1994).
141 For more on the distinction between attendant circumstance and conduct, see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
142 The word "usually" is used because this does not appear to always be the case.
See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., State v. 1979 Cadillac Deville, 632 So. 2d 1221, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
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government's argument that sections 881 (a) (7) and 841(a) (1) pos-
sess separate elements because "the forfeiture statute subsumes all
of section 841(a) (1) and, therefore, renders the criminal convic-
tion and the civil forfeiture the 'same offense' as defined by
Blockburger."145 The statute's text supports this argument. Section
881 (a) (4) provides for the forfeiture of conveyances that can be
linked to contraband "which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter."146 Section
881 (a) (6) provides for the forfeiture of proceeds connected to
"violation[s] of this subchapter."'147 Likewise, section 881(a)(7) al-
lows forfeiture of real property having a nexus with "a violation of
this subchapter."14
A closer examination of section 881, however, reveals that the
government need not prove a violation of the controlled substance
statutes to obtain forfeiture in every case. 4 1 First, forfeiture un-
der all three sections is available for property which is "intended"
to be used to commit or facilitate a violation of the underlying
drug offense. 5' In these cases, the government could obtain for-
feiture without proving an actual criminal violation so long as it
could prove the property was merely intended to be used to violate
or facilitate a violation of the relevant criminal statutes. 5' Sec-
(finding state forfeiture statutes modeled after § 881 incorporated statutes prohibiting
illegal drug activity). For a discussion of incorporation, see supra Part II.B.3. See also Gar-
rett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985) (finding that there being "no reference to
other statutory offenses" in continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988
& Supp. V 1993), weighs in favor of determination that statute is separate offense from
predicate offenses).
144 872 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
145 Id. at 824 ("Section 881 (a)(7) is premised upon a violation of Title 21 . . . [and]
therefore, requires a preceding violation of the controlled substance statutes."). The court
stated further that "[t]o accept the Government's argument that the sections involve
different elements simply because one section of the statute deals with property and the
other people, would be to adopt a circular and illusory theory." Id.
146 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1988); see also id. § 881(a)(2). Section 881(a)(4) incorpo-
rates §§ 881(a)(1)-(2) within its text. See supra note 3.
147 Id. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
148 Id. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
149 For a state case in accord, see State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613, 618 (Wash. 1994)
(leaving open possibility that criminal and civil drug offense penalties may not punish for
the "same offense").
150 Id. § 881(a)(4), (6), (7) (1988); see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
151 Forfeiture for an intended violation, while apparently avoiding double jeopardy
problems, may run afoul of the fundamental due process notion that punishable crimes
must contain both a mens rea and actus reus component and that the government may
not punish a lawful act done with criminal intent. JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53-63 (1991).
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ond, the government could pursue forfeiture premised upon dif-
ferent criminal violations than those being charged in the indict-
ment.1 52 For example, the defendant could be charged with dis-
tributing controlled substances under section 841(a)(1), and the
property forfeited because it was used to manufacture the sub-
stances under section 856.15 If the defendant had not been pros-
ecuted for a violation of section 856, the forfeiture could be said
to punish for a separate and different offense. Therefore, depend-
ing upon the actual facts of a particular set of proceedings, the
forfeiture statute may or may not incorporate the relevant criminal
violation."'.
Generally speaking, it is true the Blockburger test should be ap-
plied by analyzing the elements of a statute on its face, without
regard to the specific facts underlying the proceedings.'55 Apply-
ing this logic, it could be argued that violations of the controlled
substances laws "cannot be abstracted from the 'element"' of a
violation of the forfeiture statute since section 881 "incorporate[s]
the entire governing criminal code in the same manner as the
Harris felony-murder statute incorporated the several enumerated
felonies."'56 Under this view, "the underlying substantive criminal
152 See United States v. Sherrett, No. CR 92-298-JO, 1995 WL 79917, at *7 (D. Or.
Feb. 8, 1995); Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359, 362 (S.D. Cal. 1995). In
Sherrett, the court examined the forfeiture complaint to determine if it was based on the
charges subsequently charged in the criminal indictment. The court noted that although
the government could have premised forfeiture on an uncharged offense, the forfeiture
complaint's broad allegations incorporated all charged offenses as well, and was therefore
based upon offenses which the government was subsequently seeking to punish criminally.
Sherret4 1995 WL 79917, at *8.
153 Distributing and manufacturing under § 841(a)(1) could be characterized as sepa-
rate offenses since the' government need not prove the defendant manufactured to prove
distribution, nor that the defendant distributed to prove manufacture.
Similarly, because conspiracy to commit an offense is not the "same" as the underly-
ing predicate offense, United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1993), property could be
forfeited because it was involved in a dni- conspiracy while the offender could be prose-
cuted for the predicate offense, and vice versa.
154 See Hill v. Tennessee, 868 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). In Hil, the state
claimed that the plaintiff's vehicle was seized because he had used the car to transport
marijuana seeds. The state further claimed that he had been criminally prosecuted for
possession or manufacture of living plants, a separate offense. Because the plaintiff de-
nied transporting seeds, the court denied the government's request to dismiss his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the forfeiture. Id. at 225-26. However, the case demon-
strates a situation where the relevant criminal statute would not be incorporated within
the forfeiture statute.
155 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993) (overruling the "same con-
duct" test of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)).
156 Id. at 2857.
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offense is 'a species of lesser-included offense.'1 5 7
However, support for looking behind the actual wording of
the statute to determine which provision is actually being incorpo-
rated in a particular case can be found in Supreme Court cases
doing just that.1"8 In Harris v. Oklahoma,59 for instance, the
Court invalidated a subsequent conviction for "robbery with fire-
arms" because that offense had been used as the predicate offense
in obtaining a prior conviction for felony murder." However,
the Court would have likely upheld a conviction for felony murder
predicated on a separate offense because the conviction for the
greater crime would not have included the prior conviction for
the lesser crime (robbery with firearms). In other words, it is not
enough to say that the felony murder statute incorporates all vio-
lent felonies and therefore precludes all subsequent convictions
for violent felonies arising out of the same facts.' Assuming the
latter prosecution is not for an offense that is the "same" as the
predicate offense that was used to establish felony murder, the
latter prosecution would be for a separate offense, not for a "spe-
cies of lesser-included offense." 62  Similarly, civil forfeiture,
though incorporating the criminal drug code, can be predicated
on different offenses from the ones criminally charged.' If the
predicate offense is indeed separate from the one criminally
charged, the mere fact that the statute's wording incorporates
"violation[s] of this subchapter" should not preclude parallel for-
feiture and criminal proceedings.' For example, if the defen-
dant were to be criminally convicted of manufacturing controlled
157 Id. (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980)).
158 See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text; cf. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.
773, 786 (1985) (-[W]e must examine not only the statute which Congress has enacted,
but also the charges which form the basis of the Government's prosecution here.").
159 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
160 Id.; see also notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
161 Dixon overruled the same facts approach. See supra note 155. The approach of
looking behind the statute to determine the actual predicate offense is indeed a statuto-
rily based rather than a factually based approach. It is not concerned with whether the
same evidence will be introduced, but with whether the government will prove different
elements. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); supra note 47.
162 For example, assume that a defendant is convicted of felony murder based on
the underlying felony of armed robbery. A subsequent prosecution for a rape that oc-
curred during the robbery would not be barred by the prior felony murder conviction
even though the rape could have served as the predicate offense.
163 See Sandra Guerra, Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures and Drug Offense Sentencing, 78
MINN. L. REV. 805, 848 n.186 (1994) (noting that prosecutors could premise civil and
criminal actions on two different violations).
164 For support of this view, see supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
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substances and that conviction then served as the basis for forfei-
ture, the criminal conviction could be analogized to a "species of
lesser-included offense." Although it is not necessary to prove
manufacturing to obtain forfeiture, it is permissible, and if done,
amounts to punishing' for the offense of manufacturing twice in
separate proceedings." But this result could arguably be avoid-
ed.
In a similar vein, the government could predicate the forfei-
ture on the acts of a party other than the defendant. If the gov-
ernment can prove that the property was involved in the third
party's illegal conduct, the defendant would not be punished twice
by the forfeiture because the forfeiture would be based upon a
different offense than the one for which the defendant had been
convicted; in fact, a party other than the defendant would have
been punished by the forfeiture. Forfeiture in such a case would
be premised upon the acts of a different individual and would
necessarily pass muster under the Double Jeopardy Clause."6
Premising forfeiture on the acts of a third party raises a dif-
ferent, yet related, issue of the "same offense" requirement. The
Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Torres6  that jeopardy
does not attach when defendants do not make themselves parties
to the civil proceeding."ta  In Torres the defendant forfeited
$60,000 under section 881 (a) (6) prior to being convicted of drug
offenses. The court upheld the imprisonment because the defen-
dant had not made himself a party to the civil action,169 but it
intimated that double jeopardy would have been violated if he had
been a party. The court recommended that, in the future, the
United States should seek forfeiture and imprisonment in one
proceeding.70 Torres represents a variation of the "same offense"
165 See generally supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text; United States v. Felix, 112
S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992).
166 United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, No. Civ. A. 94CV1384, 1995 WL
60733, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 1995).
167 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
168 Accord United States v. Nakamoto, No. CRIM. 94-O1188DAE, 1995 WL 67144 (D.
Haw. Feb. 14, 1995); United States v. Walsh, 873 F. Supp. 334 (D. Ariz. 1994) (relief
denied to a defendant who failed to make himself a party to the civil proceeding be-
cause of, inter alia, the impermissibility of allowing defendants to choose their punish-
ment).
169 Tors, 28 F.3d at 1465.
170 Id. at 1464. Though appearing to accept that civil and criminal proceedings are
"separate," the court did not address the possibility that Austin may not apply to §
881(a)(6) or that there may be a "separate offense" problem. The concurring opinion
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argument. If the defendant at issue does not become a party to
the civil action, arguably no double jeopardy violation occurs be-
cause jeopardy does not attach nor is the defendant twice pun-
ished.1
7 1
In conclusion, it appears that summarily assuming section 881
punishes for the same offenses as, or is a greater included of-
fense 172 of, the criminal drug statutes is unwise. First, the govern-
did not accept the court's dicta, preferring instead to wait until the issue comes squarely
before the court. Id. at 1466 (Ripple, J., concurring).
171 This logic seems somewhat specious. Although jeopardy does not technically at-
tach in the sense that the defendant was never prosecuted in the civil action, punish-
ment surely occurs if the proceeding results in the defendant being deprived of property
in which he or she has a legally recognized property interest. Cynthia Sherrill Wood,
Note, Asset Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: An Epilogue to Austin v. United States,
29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1357, 1397 (1994) ("Losing one's property to the government is
surely punishment, whether one took the opportunity to intervene or not.").
Torres does make a strong case, however, in that it involved proceeds forfeitable
under § 881 (a) (6). The best indicia of ownership of cash could very well be the fact that
the party claims the money in the forfeiture proceeding. In the cases of conveyances and
real estate forfeitable under §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7), however, ownership will undoubt-
edly be evidenced by title documents or deeds. Because the law recognizes these docu-
ments as evidencing ownership, taking these property rights should amount to punish-
ment regardless of whether the owner asserts the ownership interest in the civil action.
Cf United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993) (sei-
zure of home deprived claimant of "property interests protected by the Due Process
Clause"); id. at 501 (The "right to maintain control over [the] home, and to be free
from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing impor-
tance."). Failure to appear, although apparently waiving any due process claim (if notice
was given), arguably should not operate to waive an ownership claim, and in turn, a fu-
ture double jeopardy claim. Likewise, drug offenders should not be able to insulate
themselves from future criminal sanction merely because they make a claim on property
in which they have no real ownership interest. Tores, however, has been received well by
the courts. In addition to cases cited supra note 168, see People v. Towns, Nos. 2-93-
1376, 2-94-0111, 1995 WL 77588 (Ill. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1995) (opinion as yet unreleased
and subject to withdrawal).
172 A corollary argument that could be made regarding the "same offense" issue is
that § 881 is not a greater included offense of the criminal drug offenses because of the
different standards of proof in the civil and criminal proceedings. See Durosko v. Lewis,
882 F.2d 357, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1989) (standard of proof should be considered an ele-
ment for purposes of Blockburger), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 907 (1990). A prosecutor who
establishes a violation of a greater included offense "necessarily has established" a viola-
tion of the lesser included offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1977). But a
prosecutor who establishes a valid § 881 claim simply has not established a violation of
any criminal statute because any criminal violation would have been proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence in the civil action and not beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf One
Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar forfeiture subsequent to an acquittal because the different standards
of proof preclude collateral estoppel).
Kurth Ranch and Halper are not necessarily inconsistent with this argument. It could
be argued that the tax and forfeiture statutes involved in those cases were in fact the
lesser included offenses. Establishing criminal violations in those cases did "necessarily estab-
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ment should be afforded the opportunity to prove that it is predi-
cating the forfeiture claim on a claim "separate" and different
from any charges being criminally prosecuted. If the government
can prove that the defendant committed more than one statutory
offense and that it is prosecuting for one offense and using the
other as the basis of forfeiture, no double jeopardy violation oc-
curs. Obviously, the government's commonly used method of bas-
ing a motion for summary judgment in the civil action upon a
prior criminal conviction would raise serious doubts about whether
the defendant was being punished for the "same offense."
Second, the government should be afforded the opportunity
to prove that forfeiture is predicated upon the actions of a party
who is not the owner of the property or is not a claimant in the
civil proceeding. This would include the opportunity to prove that
the property's forfeiture is being based on the actions of a third
party and that the owner-defendant is not an innocent owner.
Finally, the government should be allowed to offer proof that the
forfeiture is based on the property being "intended" to be used to
violate or facilitate a violation of the criminal statutes. If the gov-
ernment proves intent via a completed offense which is being or
has been criminally prosecuted successfully, that offense may then
be "a species of lesser-included offense," hence barring forfeiture.
However, if the forfeiture is based upon an inchoate, but intend-
ed, violation, forfeiture would be allowable (disregarding any due
process claims) since it would be based upon an incomplete of-
fense for which the defendant would not have been prosecut-
ed.173
In applying these principles, courts may wish to avoid an
"overly technical interpretation of" the Double Jeopardy
Clause, 4 recognizing that the "Double Jeopa'rdy Clause is not
lish" a valid civil claim because proving the claim beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
established the same claim by a preponderance of evidence. Cf. United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 441 n.4 (1989). One could argue that unlike § 881, those statutes did not
require the proof of an element in addition to those required for criminal conviction.
The problem at hand is reversed. It is usually argued that the § 881 civil statute is
the greater included offense, not the lesser. The strength of this admittedly technical ar-
gument, however, is dubious it best since, inter alia, it was not even a consideration of
the Court in Kurth Ranch or Halper.
173 The court would have to reevaluate the government's "intended offense" claim if
the defendant had been criminally convicted of attempt, which is itself an inchoate of-
fense.
174 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2869 (1993) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations
by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of
temporal or spatial units."75 Prosecutors validly utilizing parallel
proceedings must therefore draw clear lines between predicate and
charged offenses. The chance of success can also be increased by
respecting the Double Jeopardy Clause's principles of fairness and
finality; prosecutorial overreaching is likely to weigh against a
finding of validity. In sum, a per se rule that section 881 forfeiture
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when instituted after criminal
conviction is not required by existing law. Although the "separate
offense" issue has yet to be fully considered by the courts, it does
not deserve to and should not be assumed away in summary
fashion.
IV. A FINAL CAVEAT: IS SECTION 881 (A) (6) PUNISHMENT?
A. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
Although yet to take a position on Millan's "single, coordinat-
ed prosecution" test, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a unique posi-
tion concerning section 881 (a) (6) forfeitures. The court has relied
upon the fact that Austin is limited to forfeitures under sections
881 (a) (4) and (a) (7)176 to find that section 881 (a) (6) does not
punish for some offense. In United States v. Tilley,177 the defen-
dants sought the dismissal of a criminal indictment because, they
argued, the prior civil forfeiture of $650,000 in proceeds from
drug sales had punished them, and any additional criminal penalty
would be multiple punishment in a separate proceeding.' 78
Applying Halper, the court held that
[t]he forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug sales serves the
wholly remedial purposes of reimbursing the government for
the costs of detection, investigation, and prosecution of drug
traffickers and reimbursing society for the costs of combatting
the allure of illegal drugs, caring for the victims .... lost pro-
ductivity, etc. 1
79
Because illegal proceeds are inextricably linked to the amount of
drug sold, the court found that there is no danger the amount
175 Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.
176 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
177 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
178 Id. at 296.
179 Id. at 299. The defendants were involved in a large criminal enterprise which pos-
sessed millions of dollars of illegal drug proceeds. Id. at 297.
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forfeited will be disproportionate to the harm inflicted upon soci-
ety. Therefore, the court found that section 881(a)(6) forfeitures
are always remedial and never punitive. In short, according to the
court, "the logic of Austin is inapplicable to § 881(a)(6)-the for-
feiture of drug proceeds." 8 '
Additionally, the court found no reason for the law to protect
property rights in illegal proceeds.181 Because there is no right to
possess ill-gotten gains, the argument goes, the property is essen-
tially in and of itself contraband. Those affected by section
881 (a) (6) forfeitures simply have no right to ownership,8 2 similar
to the bank robber who has no right to possess the proceeds ac-
quired by holding up banks."3 Under Tiley, it appears that for-
feitures under section 881 (a) (6) can never violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that forfeiture
under section 881(a) (6) is always punishment." Applying the
factors set forth in Austin, the court held that section 881 (a) (6)
forfeiture is punishment per se. In addition, the court found that
since section 881 (a) (6) provides for the forfeiture of proceeds
used or intended for use to facilitate a violation of the drug
laws,ls the amount forfeited is not inextricably linked to the cost
of harm to society and the government. The scope of the section
is broad enough to include gains that are not ill-gotten; for exam-
ple, the section would arguably allow for the forfeiture of legally
earned moneys which were intended to be used for the purchase
180 Id. at 300; ef. SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (disgorgement
of illicit gains from violations of securities laws remedial in nature).
181 Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
182 See Maldonado v. United States, Nos. 94 CIV. 7120 (LBS), 90 CR. 228 (LBS),
1995 WL 6253, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1995) ("[T]he nature of the seizure of drug pro-
ceeds (as distinguished from property that facilitates narcotics trafficking) is such that it
does not trigger double jeopardy concern[, e]specially . . . where ... the amount of
drug proceeds seized at the time of the arrest is so disproportionately small in compar-
ison to the scope of the narcotics trafficking." (citing United States v. United States Cur-
rency in the Amount of $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 72
(1994); Tilley, 18 F.3d 295)).
183 See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989)
("A robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has
stolen from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is apprehended. The mon-
ey, though in his possession, is not rightfully his . . ").
184 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218-22 (9th Cir. 1994).
The court explicitly rejected Tilley, id. at 1220, reading Austin as requiring the court to
consider the statute as a whole rather than the particular property to be forfeited. Id.
(citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.14 (1993)).
185 See generally supra note 5.
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of a house to store controlled substances. Because of the court's
decision to examine section 881(a) (6) as a whole (as opposed to a
particularized finding of in which category of proceeds the money
at issue falls),"' the court held that the forfeiture action was pre-
cluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
B. The Better View: § 881(a)(6) Forfeiture is Punishment
Before section 881 (a)(6) forfeiture can be found to barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause,"7 it is true that there must be an
initial determination that it is punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.1  The specific test to determine whether the provisions
of section 881 punish is set forth in Austin v. United States.'89 The
Austin Court held that conveyance and real estate forfeitures un-
der section 881 are punishment per se because they "cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purpos-
es. 19. The Court based its decision on the "historical under-
standing of forfeiture as punishment, the clear focus of §§
881(a) (4) and (a)(7) on the culpability of the owner, and the evi-
dence that Congress understood those provisions as serving to
deter and to punish."19" '
186 See generally supra notes 5; infra note 196 and accompanying text.
187 Prior to Halper and Austin, the Court routinely upheld civil forfeitures as remedial
measures which do not punish. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitch-
ell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
188 Part III of this Note assumes that Austin's holding that § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
forfeitures are punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment applies equally to the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Some state courts have rejected this view. See, e.g., State v. John-
son, 632 So. 2d 817, 818 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Ex parte Camara, Nos. 13-94-048-CR, 13-94-
050-CR, 1994 WL 669807, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1994); Romero v. State, No. 06-
94-00002-CV., 1994 WL 601390, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994). These courts' posi-
dons seem untenable considering Austin relied in part on Halper, Austin, 113 S. Ct. at
2806, 2812; and because the Austin Court noted that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause has
been held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only where the forfeiture
could be properly characterized as remedial." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4.
189 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). Halper sets forth general guidelines to determine whether
a civil remedy rises to the level of punishment, but the test in Austin specifically applies
the Halper concept to § 881.
190 Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)); cf De-
partment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994) (pointing to the
legislature's intent to deter possession of marijuana as factor weighing in favor of finding
that marijuana tax was punitive).
191 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
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These three factors equally apply to section 881(a) (6), and it
should therefore follow that the section does indeed inflict punish-
ment. First, Austin's historical analysis applies to all types of forfei-
ture statutes generally: "We conclude . . . that forfeiture generally
and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been
understood, at least in part, as punishment."'92 Second, the
Court found that the inclusion of an innocent owner's defense in
sections 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) indicates a Congressional intent to
punish because the provisions focus solely on culpable parties.
Section 881 (a) (6) likewise makes a defense available to innocent
owners. 9  Furthermore, as with sections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7),
forfeiture under section 881 (a) (6) is tied in a similar manner to
commissions of criminal offenses,9 4 further revealing an intent
to punish criminal conduct. Finally, as with the provisions consid-
ered in Austin, the legislative history of section 881(a) (6) reveals
the punitive nature of the provision. When section 881 was
amended in 1978 to include subsection (a) (6), Congress noted
that "[d]ue to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes," property
should only be forfeited if there is a "substAntial connection be-
tween the property and the underlying criminal activity."'95
Importantly, Austin deviated from Halpe's analysis in one
respect. Whereas Halper requires -a "particularized assessment" of
the actual sanction imposed in the individual case to determine if
the sanction is punishment,9 Austin found that "it makes sense
to focus on §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) as a whole" because "[t]he
value of the conveyances and real property forfeitable under
[these provisions] ... can vary so dramatically that any relation-
ship between the Government's actual costs and the amount of
the sanction is merely coincidental."97 Similarly, the amount of
192 Id. at 2810.
193 See supra note 5.
194 See supra notes 5, 143-48 and accompanying text.
195 Joint House-Senate Explanation of Senate Amendment, Title III-Forfeiture of
Proceeds of Illegal Drug Transactions, 124 CONG. REc. 34,671 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522. Although part of the legislative history of § 881(a)(6), this lan-
guage was quoted by the Austin Court to support its finding that § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7)
forfeiture is punishment, showing the Court's view of the similarity between those provi-
sions and § 881(a)(6). Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
196 Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
197 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14. Kurth Ranch provided additional support for its
conclusion that Montana's marijuana tax was punitive by pointing to the lack of nexus
between the State's formula to compute the tax and the State's actual damages. Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
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proceeds forfeited via section 881 (a) (6) varies dramatically with
and has no rational relation to the amount of the government's
actual costs. It would seem to follow, therefore, that section
881(a)(6) should be considered as a whole when determining
whether it punishes, rather than examining each particular section
881(a)(6) forfeiture and making case-by-case determinations.' 9
Because of the ostensible applicability of Austin to section
881(a) (6), when considered as a whole, section 881(a) (6) imposes
punishment.' 99
Despite this apparently sound conclusion, the Tilley court and
others have a good point; perhaps other factors not involved in
sections 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) should dictate different treatment
for section 881 (a) (6). The argumentation of those who take this
position usually proceeds on two fronts: first, because section
881 (a) (6) targets illegal proceeds, it is inherently remedial and
rationally related to the costs society and the government bear for
illegal drug activity; and second, because section 881 (a) (6) targets
illegal proceeds and drug proceeds are illegal to possess, they are
constitutionally forfeitable as ill-gotten gains."' 0 The common-
sense theme running through both contentions is that disgorging
illegally obtained drug proceeds cannot amount to punishment.
This Note will independently consider and reject each of these
positions.
As a preliminary matter, the underlying premise of both argu-
ments, that section 881 (a) (6) forfeits illegal drug proceeds, is
flawed. The provision, for instance, is said to be remedial because
it provides for the "forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug sales."2"'
This statement, however, is an oversimplification of section
881 (a) (6). In addition to things of value given in exchange for
controlled substances, the provision provides for the forfeiture of
(1) "things of value ... intended to be furnished by any person
in exchange for a controlled substance," and (2) "all moneys ...
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this sub-
198 See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220 & n.10 (9th
Cir. 1994); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 826 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United
States v. 4204 Thomdale Ave., No. 92 C 3744, 1994 WL 687628, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7,
1994).
199 See David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions 46 OKLA. L. REv. 587, 636-37 (1993) (but arguing
that forfeiture of contraband and raw materials is not punishment).
200 See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
201 United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994).
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chapter.""2 Valuables which have not yet been used to purchase
illegal drugs but which are intended for such a use have not yet
attained the status of "proceeds of illegal drug sales." More clearly,
the forfeiture of moneys used or intended to be used to facilitate
a violation of the drug laws includes situations analogous to forfei-
tures under sections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7), with the exception that
section 881 (a) (6) involves liquid assets." 3 Because the scope of
forfeiture under section 881 (a) (6) is broader than ill-gotten gains,
it cannot be said that the section is always inherently remedial or
that the possessor never has a right to possess the property. Be-
cause Austin precludes the court from examining the nature of
the particular proceeds forfeited and section 881(a) (6) includes
"facilitation" proceeds as does sections 881(a) (4) and (a) (7), sec-
tion 881(a) (6) can only be characterized as serving, in part, to
punish and deter. Provisions which are not solely remedial inflict
punishment under Austiz and Halper, and the Court could very
easily find that the section amounts to punishment per se.
Even assuming the underlying premise (that section 881(a) (6)
only covers illegal drug proceeds) were true, the two arguments
which flow from the premise seem as dubious. Initially, serious
doubt exists as to whether it follows that all forfeiture of illegal
proceeds is inherently remedial. Tilley found that "the forfeiture of
drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the amount
of drugs sold."2 This much is theoretically sound, but the court
goes further: "The more drugs sold, the more proceeds that will
be forfeited . .. [and] these proceeds are roughly proportional to
the harm inflicted upon the government and society by the drug
sale."0 5 Despite this conclusory claim of proportionality, any rela-
tionship between the government's costs in a particular case and
the amount forfeited is surely coincidental. Even if larger drug
transactions do result in higher "actual costs" 20 6 for the govern-
202 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); see supra note 5.
203 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 1994)
("This statutory language is not limited to criminal proceeds-that is, money that has been
furnished in exchange for drugs .... In addition to narcotics proceeds, the statute ren-
ders forfeitable money that someone intends to use to purchase drugs, or even money
that someone intends to use to purchase a car or boat in order to facilitate-an illegal
narcotics transaction."); United States v. 4204 Thordale Ave., No. 92 C 3744, 1994 WL
687628, at *10 (N.D. III. Dec. 7, 1994) ("[F]orfeiture under § 881(a)(6) is not limited to
drug profits or proceeds."); see supra note 5.
204 Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
205 Id.
206 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14.
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ment, a rational relation between the two is lacking. For example,
the proportional cost difference between prosecuting a $1,000,000
and $1,000 drug transaction is probably not approximately 1,000
to 1. As for costs to society, Austin noted that forfeiture has "abso-
lutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the
cost of enforcing the law."2 7 In sum, the argument that section
881 (a) (6) is inherently remedial because it exclusively targets ille-
gal drug proceeds fails on empirical grounds and ignores Austin's
rejection of such a proposition.
The second position taken by the courts which follow Tilley is
that there is no right to possess illegal proceeds, which essentially
qualify as contraband."0  Because the property is not lawfully de-
rived, the argument goes, the owner has no property right which
the law should protect."° The bank robber example demon-
strates the persuasiveness of this contention.210 As appealing as
this argument may appear at first glance, however, it is simply not
true that drug offenders have no property rights in illegally ob-
tained proceeds.
Property rights are, as described by Chief Justice Marshall,
"the creature of civil society, and subject, in all respects, to the
disposition and contr[ol] of civil institutions."211 The reason peo-
207 Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
208 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. This argument is distinguishable
from the argument that proceeds are forfeitable because they are "instrumentalities" of
the offense. While instrumentalities are used to commit an offense, proceeds are the
actual illegal fruits of unlawful activity. Proceeds are not forfeitable because they are
instrumentalities any more than conveyances and real estate are. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at
2811 (conveyances and real estate not forfeitable as "instruments" of criminal activity).
But cf. United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73 (2d
Cir.) (currency forfeitable as instrument of crime of not reporting the taking of more
than $10,000 outside of the United States), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 72 (1994).
209 Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300 ("'[T]he government does not violate the Sixth Amendment
if it seizes . . . robbery proceeds, and refuses to permit the defendant to use them to
pay for his defense . . .' because '[t]he money, though in [the defendant's] possession,
is not rightfully his.'" (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S.
617, 626 (1989))); United States v. $288,930.00 in U.S. Currency, 838 F. Supp. 367, 370
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding § 881(a)(6) is not punishment because the "claimant does not
rightfully own the forfeited property").
210 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. It should be noted that this argument
rests upon the underlying premise that § 881(a)(6) involves illegal drug proceeds. Be-
cause Austin precludes a particularized assessment of the property forfeited, § 881(a)(6)
nevertheless amounts to punishment per se because of the broad scope of the provision.
211 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 211 (1796). The view that property rights
are creatures of statute can be reconciled with the view that property rights are somehow
"natural" rights. Although Blackstone, for instance, referred to private property as "abso-
lute," he recognized that society ultimately defines precisely what rights one has acquired
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ple have no property rights in contraband is because a legislative
enactment makes it so.212 Section 881(a)(6), however, recognizes
and gives a legal property right in illegal proceeds to the drug
offender. Property rights can be thought of as a "bundle of sticks,"
and Congress has granted at least one stick to the drug offender
by recognizing the right of the offender to alienate the proceeds
to an innocent party.213 In fact, the property right to alienate
granted by section 881(a) (6) is substantial. The transfer does not
need to be to. a bona fide purchaser; giving the proceeds to an
innocent donee will protect the proceeds from forfeiture.1 4 In
this regard, the property right to the money is greater than a
bank robber, who because of obtaining the property through
fraud in the factum (theft), has no right to possess or pass good
title (alienate) .215 Furthermore, the drug offender's rights are
even more substantial than one who obtains property through
fraud in the inducement: such a person has voidable title and can
pass good title, but only to a BFP.21'6 The drug offender, howev-
er, can alienate even to a donee, and so possesses' a statutorily-
given (via section 881(a)(6)) property right that is lawful and dif-
ferent from the rights of a bank robber in stolen money. There-
fore, Tilley's conclusory statement that a drug offender has no
right to possess illegal drug proceeds is an appealing, but mislead-
ing statement of law.
Another problem with applying a property rights theory to
section 881(a) (6) is that such a theory may go too far by applying
just as well to forfeitures under sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7),
which unquestionably are punishment. The first Sentence of sec-
tion 881(a) provides that "[t]he following shall be subject to for-
and can transfer in property. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Pop-
erty, 26 VAL U. L. REV. 367, 370-71 (1991).
212 See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (stating that con-
traband which was illegally seized need not be returned to defendants because they have
no right to it), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
No statute defines illegal drug proceeds as "contraband," and proceeds obviously are
not. "Contraband" cannot be transferred to a third party and insulated from seizure.
Contraband means no one can continue to possess the item, regardless of state of mind.
Illegal drug proceeds, as will be seen, are not illegal in and of themselves to possess.
213 This right derives from the innocent owner's defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(1988). The proceeds cannot be forfeited if they have been transferred to one without
knowledge or consent of the drug activity.
214 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
215 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (1977).
216 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1979); Langley v. FDIC, 484
U.S. 86, 93-94 (1987).
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feiture ... and no property right shall exist in them."217 Further-
more, the "forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commis-
sion of the act."21 In other words, under any provision of sec-
tion 881, the owner arguably has no lawful property right in the
thing forfeited. Just as Tilley argues that no right exists to possess
illegal drug proceeds, one could argue that section 881 divests per-
sons of property interests deserving of legal protection in convey-
ances and real estate. Sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), however, do
exact punishment even though "no property right" exists in the
items at" the time of forfeiture. Therefore, section 881 (a) (6)
should be construed to punish even though it takes property
which the defendant has no right to possess. The section does
take a legal property right, the right to alienate, and that taking
punishes for some offense.
An alternative view to support the forfeiture of illegal pro-
ceeds is that equitable principles support the forfeiture of property
which owes its existence to unlawful activity. As Tilley states at one
point, perhaps the forfeiture of the property "does not punish the
defendant because it exacts no price in liberty or lawfully derived
property."219 Instead of being based on principles of property
rights, the equitable justification for forfeiture could be that per-
sons should not be allowed to benefit from their own misconduct.
Sections 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) are not affected because those stat-
utes affect conveyances and real estate ostensibly derived from
lawful means, but put to use for illegal purposes." Notions of
justice arguably support the forfeiture of illegally obtained proper-
ty, whether the property be proceeds of a drug sale or a bank
robbery.
The equity evident in returning stolen money to a bank, how-
ever, is missing to some degree in the context of illegal drug
proceeds. Whereas the property is returned to the rightful owner,
the bank, in the robbery example, drug proceeds are transferred
to the government, who never owned them to begin with. In fact,
217 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
218 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S.
1, 16 (1890)). Once title is perfected by judicial proceedings, the vesting of title relates
back to the commission of the offense. Id.
219 United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
220 Cf One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (stating
that an automobile which has been illegally seized may be returned to the defendant be-
cause, unlike contraband, possessing a motor vehicle is not intrinsically illegal).
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equity protects the bank because of the bank's innocence com-
bined with the bank's legitimate property claim to the money. The
government's rights to illegal proceeds, however, is derived from
section 881(a)(6) and, as we have seen, that statute also grants a
property interest to the offender.
Equitable principles do, however, seem to support the forfei-
ture of illegal proceeds to some extent in that the law should not
allow one to profit from illegal activity. 1 Although seemingly
based on a slender reed of equitable principles, courts could hold,
as the Fifth Circuit has, that the forfeiture of illegal proceeds is
not punishment. Assuming the validity of the position, this Part
argues that the court should perform an assessment of which type
of section 881(a)(6) proceeds2 are involved in the case before
passing on the punishment issue because of the different types of
property covered by the section. Austin's suggestion that section
881 be read as a whole would be subverted to some degree, but
such an assessment appears necessary if the court entertains the
Tilley view because the government may be seeking the forfeiture
of "facilitation" proceeds. If the court finds the proceeds are ill-
gotten, the forfeiture would not be punishment. Otherwise, the
property is "intent" or "facilitation" property and constitutes pun-
ishment in part and implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause."
On balance, this approach is preferable to a per se rule that sec-
tion 881(a)(6) is not punishment, but it requires taking some
liberty with Supreme Court precedent. On balance, the better view
seems to be that the Court would rely upon the reasoning of
Austin and find section 881 (a) (6) is punishment per se, leaving no
room for a "particularized assessment."
V. THE MArTER OF REMEDY
Courts that have found that section 881 punishes the same
offense as criminal drug statutes in a single proceeding have usual-
ly held that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that the second
221 See generally Boyar v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 383 (E.D. La. 1969); cf Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (government should not profit from illegal activity in context of
Fourth Amendment searches and seizures).
222 For an explanation of the types of proceeds forfeitable under § 881(a)(6), see
supra note 5.
223 This approach is being utilized by at least one federal court, but in the Eighth
Amendment context. See United States v. $45,140.00 Currency, 839 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
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punishment be vacated. 24 If the Supreme Court were to eventu-
ally hold that civil forfeiture via section 881 is the functional
equivalent of a second prosecution for the same offense,' then
it is true that all second proceedings should be dismissed, or their
sentences or punishments vacated.2" On the other hand, if civil
proceedings punish but are not criminal prosecutions, then the
multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause is sole-
ly at issue and a different result is in order. 7 Assuming only the
multiple punishment prong is involved, the unique nature of the
double jeopardy violation in these situations demands a unique
remedy.
Two distinct situations can arise in which a drug offender is
punished in successive proceedings. First, a successful forfeiture ac-
tion can be followed by a conviction, and second, a conviction can
be followed by a successful forfeiture action." In the first situa-
tion, if the defendant has fully satisfied the punitive forfeiture, any
pending criminal prosecution should be dismissed, or if the prose-
cution is completed, any criminal sentence vacated.2 29 Because
the sanction resulting from prosecution is criminal punishment,
224 See, e.g. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
225 A persuasive argument can be made that civil forfeiture, albeit punishment, is not
a criminal prosecution. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. But see Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (holding subsequent marijuana
tax proceeding was functional equivalent of successive prosecution).
226 Absent the applicability of a double jeopardy exception, this would be true even
if the first proceeding were unsuccessful, resulting in no forfeiture or acquittal as the
case may be. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
227 For a discussion of the multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, see supra Part II.B.1.
228 This Part ignores scenarios in which either proceeding is unsuccessful. Assuming
the third prong of Pearce is concerned exclusively with whether punishment has occurred
and not whether a prosecution has occurred, imposing one punishment in two proceedings
(one successful, one not) would not in any event result in "multiple" punishment. See
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391 (1938)). But see Helvering, 303 U.S. at 398 ("Where the objective of the subsequent
action is punishment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain the second proceeding
for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy; and double jeopardy is
precluded by the Fifth Amendment whether the verdict was an acquittal or conviction.").
229 Cf In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1873). Technically, the criminal proceeding would not necessarily need to be dismissed
until it resulted in punishment, at which point, the punishment should be vacated. How-
ever, unless conviction can be had without punishment, dismissal seems to be appropriate
in that eventual success would be unconstitutional. But see Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at
1947 n.21 (declining to take position on whether a civil proceeding designed to inflict
punishment may bar a subsequent criminal proceeding). It should be noted that the
specific holdings of Bradley and Lange have since been limited. See discussion and cases
cited infra notes 236-40.
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imposing it would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause" if indeed
the civil action had already punished the offender for the same
offense." °
As for the second scenario, where civil forfeiture follows con-
viction, the Ninth Circuit has held that the remedy is dismissal of
the forfeiture action with prejudice. 31 However tempting the
remedy of dismissal is when the second proceeding is civil in na-
ture, it may not be required.s In Halper the Court stated its
rule -as follows:
Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty
and the civil penalty sought in a subsequent proceeding bears
no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Govern-
ment for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment"
in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is enti-
fled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs
to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second
punishment. We must leave to the trial court the discretion to
determine on the basis of such an accounting the size of the
civil sanction the Government may receive without crossing the
line between remedy and punishment."
In the case of section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) forfeiture (and this
Note argues, section 881(a)(6) forfeiture), the trial court has no
discretion to determine "if the penalty sought in fact consti-
tutes ... punishment," but the court could exercise discretion
under the second directive of Halper and determine the size of
230 United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865
(1990); Rudstein, supra note 199, at 602 n.85, 615 n.146 (1993) (cases cited).
Rudstein suggests that a subsequent conviction is allowable as long as no fine or
incarceration is imposed, and is indeed desirable because of the consequences flowing
from such a conviction, such as, e.g., the inability of convicted felons to carry firearms.
Id. at 615-16. Rudstein assumes conviction absent imposing a fine or imprisonment would
not inflict "punishment." However, because a "conviction" could perhaps in and of itself
amount to punishment for double jeopardy purposes, this Note declines to take the posi-
tion that these "collateral consequences" are nonpunitive and constitutional under the
multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
231 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994).
232 But see Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]f there is a
constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of punishment cannot pos-
sibly make any difference."); Rudstein, supra note 199, at 601-02 & nn.84-85 (collecting
sources). This Note agrees that order cannot possibly make a difference in determining
whether a double jeopardy violation has occurred, but that it should matter in determin-
ing what the appropriate remedy for that violation should be.
233 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (citing Morris v. Mathews,
475 U.S. 237 (1986)).
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award allowable .2 Applying this principle, if the government
sought forfeiture under section 881 following conviction, the trial
court would perform an accounting of the government's costs and
allow remedial damages to be collected. 5
Such an adjustment is in fact consistent with the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In
Jones v. Thomas,236 Missouri had imposed two sentences when
state law only permitted one. A Missouri court, upon realizing the
error, vacated the shorter sentence, which had been completely
served, and credited the time served against the longer
sentence.237 The Court held that the state court's remedy "fully
vindicated respondent's double jeopardy rights."1 21 Similarly, the
remedy proposed herein provides the drug offender with "every
benefit" double jeopardy affords. By allowing only a remedial
award of damages to be forfeited pursuant to section 881, no
multiple "punishment" occurs. Jones demonstrates that courts have
the flexibility to provide differing remedies so long as the poten-
tial double jeopardy violation is cured.2 9 A remedy which cures
234 Complications would arise if this were attempted in the context of §§ 881(a) (4)
and (a) (7). Because tangible property is involved, an adjustment in the amount forfeited
is more difficult than when cash is sought to be forfeited. This Note leaves open the
question of whether a tangible asset could be forfeited in conjunction with a cash reim-
bursement to the claimant in order to preserve the remedial nature of the sanction. A
portion of the statutorily allowable amount of illegal proceeds forfeited under §
881(a) (6) could however be remitted so as to impose a remedial sanction, similar to the
action taken in Halper.
235 Rudstein suggests that even in the case of a conviction 'following a civil sanction,
the government may be able to petition the trial judge from the civil action to reduce
the amount awarded to a remedial amount. Rudstein, supra note 199, at 606. After the
reduction, criminal sanction would be permissible. He concludes, however, that such a
procedure is unavailable because of, inter alia, the inability of the government to re-open
the civil case. Id. at 612.
In the case of a subsequent civil action, the civil case naturally would not have to
be "re-opened." An adjustment would merely have to made in the amount forfeited; in
fact, a reduction is demanded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ninth Circuit has
effectively held the amount must be reduced to $0, a result seemingly not required by
Halper.
236 491 U.S. 376 (1989).
237 Id. at 378-79.
238 Id. at 382. The Court relied upon the policies underlying the constitutional guar-
antee in order to reach its holding. The remedy was "consistent" with double jeopardy
principles because once the remedy took effect, the "respondent has had every benefit
the Clause affords" in that confinement was based on a "single sentence imposed for"
one crime alone. Id. at 382 & n.2.
239 See Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) (holding that reducing respondent's
jeopardy-barred conviction for aggravated murder to a conviction for murder that was not
jeopardy-barred was an adequate remedy for the double jeopardy violation); United States
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the potential defect, is a valid and "suitable protection of...
double jeopardy rights."2"
In conclusion, the remedy for a potential violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause resulting from section 881 forfeiture fol-
lowing a criminal conviction should be an accounting, after which
the court awards an amount to the government which lies just to
the remedial side of the punitive damages line. The amount could
be more than actual costs and still be remedial as the Court has
recognized that a rough approximation is all that is required. 41
Undoubtedly, the government will receive less than it was orig-
inally seeking,242 but recovery should not be completely barred.
VI. CONCLUSION
21 U.S.C. § 881 provides for the forfeiture of property which
has been used, or was intended to have been used, to commit or
facilitate drug-related crimes. Two issues that currently split the
U.S. Courts of Appeals and should eventually be resolved by the
Supreme Court in this area are whether drug asset civil forfeiture
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment when
it occurs after criminal conviction, and whether the Clause is vio-
v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide
the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact
limit of his punishment will turn out to be."); United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065 (2d
Cir.) (resentencing did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943
(1990).
240 Jones, 491 U.S. at 387.
241 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989) ("[T]he Government is entitled
to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat
imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double
damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose
of double jeopardy analysis."); id. at 449 ("[T]his inquiry will not be an exact pur-
suit .... [T]he precise amount of the Government's damages and costs may prove to
be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain .... [T]he process of aftfixing a sanction that
compensates the Government for all its costs inevitably involves an element of rough jus-
tice."); id. at 450 ("IT]he trial court's judgment in these matters often may amount to
no more than an approximation . . . ."). The Court did note that it had not decided
prior to Halper "what the Constitution commands when one of those imprecise formulas
authorizes a supposedly remedial sanction that does not remotely approximate the
Government's damages and actual costs." Id. at 446. Halper, therefore, does not foreclose,
and may suggest, the flexible remedy suggested in this Part, especially since the decision
explicitly states it does not prevent the government from obtaining a compensatory reme-
.dy after conviction. Id. at 446, 451-52.
242 Which amounts can be included under the rubric of the government's "damages
and costs" beyond actual costs is unclear. For a discussion of potential inclusions, see
Rudstein, supra note 199, at 647-53.
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lated when the forfeiture occurs before the conviction. In order to
resolve these issues, the Court will have to determine whether
section 881 punishes an individual for the same offense in a sepa-
rate proceeding. The answers to these questions are currently
unclear.
This Note argues that civil and criminal proceedings are in-
herently separate proceedings and cannot be viewed as the func-
tional equivalent of one proceeding under any circumstances.
Whether section 881 forfeiture punishes the same offense as a
criminal conviction depends upon the facts of the particular case.
It is possible for the government to convict for one offense and
seek forfeiture for a separate offense, thereby conforming to the
requirements of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Furthermore, the
government could base the forfeiture on the criminal offense of a
third party or the intended acts of the defendant; as a result, the
same individual would not be punished for an offense for which
conviction had been obtained. In those situations in which the
same offense and individual is involved, double jeopardy is offend-
ed, and the appropriate remedy depends upon the order of the
proceedings. If the civil action occurs first, the criminal proceed-
ing must be dismissed or sentence vacated. If the second proceed-
ing is civil, the court should perform an accounting and award the
government a remedial amount equal to the approximate cost of
prosecuting the action.
Finally, the Court needs to address the issue it left open in
Austin: Does forfeiture under section 881 (a) (6), which includes in
part illegal proceeds, punish? This Note argues that the provision
does indeed punish because, inter alia, it provides for the forfei-
ture of legal proceeds used to commit or facilitate drug law viola-
tions. The broad scope of the section serves in part to deter and
punish and must be viewed as such. The forfeiture of illegal pro-
ceeds is punishment in any event because the amount forfeited
has no rational relation to the remedial damages incurred by the
government in prosecuting the drug violation. Furthermore, the
taking of illegal proceeds is the taking of property in which drug
offenders have a valid property right; forfeiting the property there-
fore punishes by taking a legal property interest which is recog-
nized by Congress.
In conclusion, Austin has presented the lower courts with a
vast array of problems to deal with until further guidance is pro-
vided by the Court. Until such guidance, the safest course for the
government to take in most cases is to seek criminal forfeiture in
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the same proceeding as criminal conviction. Otherwise, in many
cases where both civil and criminal penalties are sought, the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause will inevitably be violated. However, if prose-
cutors wish to utilize both civil and criminal proceedings, they
should clearly and carefully delineate the individuals and statutory
offenses involved in each action, and courts should uphold the
practice against double jeopardy challenge if the individuals or
offenses involved in the two actions are in fact separate and dis-
tinct.
Stephen H. McClain*
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